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We introduce constructive and classical systems for nonstandard arithmetic and show
how variants of the functional interpretations due to Gödel and Shoenﬁeld can be
used to rewrite proofs performed in these systems into standard ones. These functional
interpretations show in particular that our nonstandard systems are conservative extensions
of E-HAω and E-PAω , strengthening earlier results by Moerdijk and Palmgren, and Avigad
and Helzner. We will also indicate how our rewriting algorithm can be used for term
extraction purposes. To conclude the paper, we will point out some open problems and
directions for future research, including some initial results on saturation principles.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present functional interpretations for both constructive and classical systems of nonstandard arithmetic.
The interpretations have two aspects: they show that the nonstandard systems are conservative over ordinary (standard)
ones and they show how terms can be extracted from nonstandard proofs.
After inventing nonstandard analysis and showing that it was a versatile idea leading to nonstandard proofs in various
areas of mathematics, Robinson suggested one could look at nonstandard arguments “syntactically” (proof-theoretically).
From this point of view, one would see nonstandard analysis as “introduc[ing] new deductive procedures rather than new
mathematical entities” [43]. Apparently he did not think that adding these new deductive procedures to standard systems
would make them more powerful or stronger in a proof-theoretic sense. In fact, in [42] he formulates as a general problem
“to devise a purely syntactic transformation which correlates standard and nonstandard proofs of the same theorems in a large area,
e.g., complex function theory”. In [30] he is reported as asking a more speciﬁc question, whether a certain system for nonstan-
dard arithmetic is conservative over PA. These ideas of Robinson have borne fruit in the work of Kreisel [30,31], Friedman
(unpublished), Nelson [38,39], Moerdijk, Palmgren [36,37,41], Avigad [5,2] and others, who proved for various systems for
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one could extract algorithms from their proofs which convert nonstandard arguments into standard ones.
As an example of this, let us have a short look at the work of Nelson, also because it is a major source of inspiration
for this article. The idea of Nelson was to add a new unary predicate symbol st to ZFC for “being standard”. In addition,
he added three new axioms to ZFC governing the use of this new unary predicate, called Idealization, Standardization and
Transfer. The resulting system he called IST, which stands for Internal Set Theory. The main logical result about IST is that
it is a conservative extension of ZFC, so any theorem provable in IST which does not involve the st-predicate is provable
in ZFC as well. Hence such theorems are genuine mathematical results, acceptable from the generally shared foundational
standpoint of ZFC.
The conservativity of IST over ZFC was proved twice. In the original paper where he introduces Internal Set Theory [38]
(recently reprinted with a foreword by G.F. Lawler in Volume 48, Number 4 of the Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society in recognition of its status as a classic), Nelson gives a model-theoretic argument which he attributes to Powell. In a
later publication [39], he proves the same result syntactically by providing a “reduction algorithm” (a rewriting algorithm)
for converting proofs performed in IST to ordinary ZFC-proofs. There is a remarkable similarity between his reduction
algorithm and the Shoenﬁeld interpretation [45]; this observation was the starting point for this paper.
We will work with systems in higher types, such as HAω and PAω , rather than set theory, because, as we mentioned
before, we will not just be interested in establishing conservation results, but also in extracting terms from nonstandard
proofs and “proof-mining”. Proof-mining is an area of applied logic in which one uses proof-theoretic techniques to extract
quantitive information (such as bounds on the growth rate of certain functions) from proofs in ordinary mathematics. In
addition, such techniques can reveal certain uniformities leading to new qualitative results as well. Functional interpretations
are one of the main tools in proof-mining (for an introduction to this part of applied proof theory, see [25]). To extract
interesting bounds, however, it is important that the mathematical arguments one analyses can be performed in suﬃciently
weak systems: therefore one considers systems such as HAω or PAω , or fragments thereof, rather than ZFC. The reason for
considering systems in higher types (rather than PA, for instance) is not just because they are more expressive, but also
because higher types are precisely what makes functional interpretations work.
Although establishing conservation and term extraction results for systems of nonstandard arithmetic is what this paper
is about, there is another way of looking at the results of this paper, which has more to do with the ideas of Lifschitz on cal-
culable numbers [35], of Berger on uniform Heyting arithmetic [7] and of Hernest on the light Dialectica interpretation [19],
than with nonstandard arithmetic. Their idea was to have two kinds of quantiﬁers, one with computational content and one
without. On the realizability interpretation of Lifschitz, the computationally meaningful quantiﬁers are interpreted in the
usual way (which, in the case of the existential quantiﬁer, means that a realizer needs to exhibit a witness, while a realizer
for a universal statement ∀n ϕ(n) is a program which computes a realizer of ϕ(n) from the value n). The computationally
empty quantiﬁers, on the other hand, are to be interpreted uniformly (which means that it need not exhibit a witness in
the existential case: a witness simply has to exist; while in the case of the universal quantiﬁer it has to be a realizer which,
uniformly, realizes ϕ(n) for all n).
A new unary predicate st introduces two types of quantiﬁers as well: the internal quantiﬁers ∀x and ∃x, as well as the
external quantiﬁers ∀stx and ∃stx (which can be seen as abbreviations of ∀x (st(x) → ·· ·) and ∃x (st(x) ∧ · · ·) respectively).
Our initial idea was to interpret the former uniformly, while interpreting the latter in the usual way, in complete analogy
with the ideas of Lifschitz. But this led to several, to us, undesirable effects (in particular, one could not realize the statement
that the standard natural numbers are closed downwards). Our solution was to weaken the computational meaning of the
external quantiﬁers: in particular, to realize ∃stn ϕ(n) it suﬃces to exhibit a ﬁnite lists of candidates n1, . . . ,nk such that at
least one of the statements ϕ(ni) is realized. Because of the analogy with Herbrand disjunctions from proof theory, we have
dubbed this type of realizability “Herbrand realizability”.
To make Herbrand realizability work in a higher type setting, it is convenient to work in an extension of HAω with
types for ﬁnite sequences. More precisely, we will assume that there is a type σ ∗ for sequences of objects of type σ . The
type σ ∗ carries the structure of a preorder (with x  y if every element in the list x also occurs in the list y) and one
would naturally expect realizers to be closed upwards with respect to this preorder. To make this work nicely, it will be
useful to introduce a new kind of application (of functions to arguments) which is monotone in the ﬁrst component. This
can be done and with this additional ingredient Herbrand realizability can be deﬁned. We will do this in Section 4.
It has to be admitted that the connection of Herbrand realizability to nonstandard arithmetic is rather tangential and,
as a matter of fact, we will not be very interested in Herbrand realizability per se. This will change radically if we turn to
the functional interpretation introduced in Section 5, which bears the same relation to Herbrand realizability as the usual
Dialectica interpretation does to modiﬁed realizability. It turns out that if one deﬁnes a Dialectica-type functional interpre-
tation using the new application, with implication interpreted à la Diller–Nahm [9], basing it on some of the characteristic
principles of Herbrand realizability, and the idea of having Herbrand disjunctions realize existential statements, this inter-
pretation will, almost as if by magic, interpret and eliminate principles recognizable from nonstandard analysis. Our main
reason for including Herbrand realizability is to have an easy point of access to and to provide some intuition for this
functional interpretation.
So far the techniques we mentioned work only for constructive systems. But by combining the functional interpretation
we mentioned above with negative translation, we are able to deﬁne a Shoenﬁeld-type functional interpretation for classical
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will work out the technical details in Sections 6 and 7 below.
The resulting functional interpretations have some striking similarities with the bounded functional interpretations in-
troduced by Ferreira and Oliva in [12] and [10] (see also [13]). In the same way, Herbrand realizability seems related to the
bounded modiﬁed realizability interpretation due to Ferreira and Nunes (for which, see [11]). We will brieﬂy comment on
this in Section 5 below.
The contents of this paper are therefore as follows. In Section 2 we will introduce an intuitionistic base system for our
investigations into constructive nonstandard arithmetic. In Section 3, we will discuss some principles from nonstandard
analysis and their relations. This will give one some ideas of how interpretations of nonstandard systems have to look like
and will provide us with some “benchmarks” with which one can measure the success of an interpretation. In Section 4 we
will introduce Herbrand realizability and discuss its merits as an interpretation of nonstandard arithmetic. Our nonstandard
functional interpretation will be introduced in Section 5 and we will use it to prove several conservation and term extraction
results in an intuitionistic context. In Section 6 we introduce a classical base system for nonstandard arithmetic and discuss
two variants of the negative translation. These we will use in Section 7 to obtain a Shoenﬁeld-type functional interpretation
and derive conservation and term extraction results in a classical context. Finally, Section 8 discusses work in progress on
saturation principles and other plans for future work.
2. Formalities
In this section, we introduce our base systems for investigating nonstandard arithmetic.
2.1. The system E-HAω∗
In this paper, E-HAω∗ will be the extension of the system called E-HAω0 in [48] and E-HAω→ in [49] with types for ﬁnite
sequences. More precisely, the collection of types T ∗ will be smallest set closed under the following rules:
(i) 0 ∈ T ∗;
(ii) σ ,τ ∈ T ∗ ⇒ (σ → τ ) ∈ T ∗;
(iii) σ ∈ T ∗ ⇒ σ ∗ ∈ T ∗ .
Because we have not included product types in T ∗ , we will often be handling tuples of types or terms. We will always
refer to such lists of types and terms as tuples and never as sequences, so as not to confuse them with terms of sequence
type (i.e., of type σ ∗ for some σ ∈ T ∗). In dealing with tuples, we will follow the notation and conventions of [48] and [25].
In particular, if x = x0, . . . , xm−1 and y = y0, . . . , yn−1, then
1. [] stands for the empty tuple, while x, y stands for x0, . . . , xm−1, y0, . . . , yn−1;
2. xi y stands for (. . . ((xi y0)y1) . . .)yn−1, while xy stands for x0 y, . . . , xm−1 y (and never for x0, . . . , xm−1 y);
3. λx . y stands for λx . y0, . . . , λx . yn−1;
4. and, ﬁnally, if x = xσ00 , . . . , xσm−1m−1 and y = yσ00 , . . . , yσm−1m−1 are tuples having the same length and types, we will write
x=σ y for
m−1∧
j=0
x j =σ j y j .
Because we have included sequence types, we will have to enrich the term language (Gödel’s T ); it now also includes
a constant 〈〉σ of type σ ∗ and an operation c of type σ → (σ ∗ → σ ∗) (for the empty sequence and the operation of
prepending an element to a sequence, respectively), as well as a list recursor Lσ ,ρ satisfying the following axioms:
Lσ ,ρ〈〉σ yz =ρ y,
Lσ ,ρc(a, x)yz =ρ z(Lσ ,ρxyz)a,
where ρ = ρ1, . . . , ρk is a k-tuple of types, y = y1, . . . , yk is a k-tuple of terms with yi of type ρi and z = z1, . . . , zk is
a k-tuple of terms with zi of type ρ1 → ·· · → ρk → σ → ρi (compare [49, p. 456] or [25, p. 48]). In addition, we have
the recursors and combinators for all the new types, satisfying the usual equations. The resulting extension we will denote
by T ∗ .
We will have a primitive notion of equality at every type and equality axioms expressing that equality is a congruence
(as in [49, pp. 448–449]). Since decidability of quantiﬁer-free formulas is not essential for this paper, this choice will not
create any diﬃculties. In addition, we assume the axiom of extensionality for functions:
f =σ→τ g ↔ ∀xσ f x=τ gx.
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have all the usual axioms of E-HAω , as in [25, pp. 48–49], for example, where it is to be understood that the induction
axiom applies to all formulas in the language (i.e., also those containing variables of sequence type and the new terms that
belong to T ∗). Finally, we add the following sequence axiom:
SA: ∀yσ ∗ (y = 〈〉σ ∨ ∃aσ , xσ ∗ y = c(a, x)).
In normal E-HAω , as in [25] or [49], for example, one can also talk about sequences, but these have to be coded up
(see [25, p. 59]). As a result, E-HAω∗ is a deﬁnitional extension of, and hence conservative over, E-HAω as deﬁned in [25]
or [49].
2.2. The system E-HAω∗st
Deﬁnition 2.1. The language of the system E-HAω∗st is obtained by extending that of E-HAω∗ with unary predicates stσ as
well as two new quantiﬁers ∀stxσ and ∃stxσ for every type σ ∈ T ∗ . Formulas in the language of E-HAω∗ (i.e., those that do
not contain the new predicate stσ or the two new quantiﬁers ∀stxσ and ∃stxσ ) will be called internal. Formulas which are
not internal will be called external.
We will adopt the following
Important convention: We follow Nelson [39] in using small Greek letters to denote internal formulas and capital Greek
letters to denote formulas which can be external.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (E-HAω∗st ). The system E-HAω∗st is obtained by adding to E-HAω∗ the axioms EQ, T ∗st and IAst, where:
• EQ stands for the deﬁning axioms of the external quantiﬁers:
∀stx Φ(x) ↔ ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)),
∃stx Φ(x) ↔ ∃x (st(x)∧Φ(x)),
with Φ(x) an arbitrary formula, possibly with additional free variables.
• T ∗st consists of:
1. the axioms st(x)∧ x= y → st(y),
2. the axiom st(t) for each closed term t in T ∗ ,
3. the axioms st( f )∧ st(x) → st( f x).
• IAst is the external induction axiom:
IAst: (Φ(0)∧ ∀stn0 (Φ(n) → Φ(n + 1)))→ ∀stn0 Φ(n),
where Φ(n) is an arbitrary formula, possibly with additional free variables.
Here it is to be understood that in E-HAω∗st the laws of intuitionistic logic apply to all formulas, while the induction axiom
from E-HAω∗(
ϕ(0)∧ ∀n0 (ϕ(n) → ϕ(n+ 1)))→ ∀n0 ϕ(n)
applies to internal formulas ϕ only.
Lemma 2.3. E-HAω∗st  Φ(x) ∧ x = y → Φ(y) for every formula Φ .
Proof. By induction on the logical structure of Φ . Note that the st-predicate is extensional by T ∗st and the case of the
external quantiﬁers ∀st and ∃st can be reduced to that of the internal quantiﬁers ∀ and ∃ by using the EQ-axiom. 
Lemma 2.4. E-HAω∗st  st0(x) ∧ y  x → st0(y).
Proof. Apply external induction to the formula Φ(x) :≡ ∀y (y  x → st(y)). 
Remark 2.5. The previous lemma implies that, whenever n is a standard natural number, a bounded internal quantiﬁer of the
form ∃sti  n can always be replaced by ∃i  n and vice versa (the same applies to the universal quantiﬁers, of course). So
we can regard such bounded quantiﬁers as internal or external, depending on what suits us best. Most often, however, it
will be convenient to regard them as internal quantiﬁers.
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from Φ by replacing st(x) by x = x, and ∀stx and ∃stx by ∀x and ∃x, respectively.
One of the reasons E-HAω∗st is such a convenient system for our proof-theoretic investigations is because we have the
following easy result:
Proposition 2.7. If a formula Φ is provable in E-HAω∗st , then its internalization Φ int is provable in E-HAω∗ . Hence E-HAω∗st is a conser-
vative extension of E-HAω∗ and E-HAω .
Proof. Clear, because the internalizations of the axioms of E-HAω∗st are provable in E-HAω∗ . 
2.3. Operations on ﬁnite sequences
Using the list recursor Lσ ,ρ one can deﬁne a length function | · | : σ ∗ → 0 satisfying∣∣〈〉σ ∣∣= 0,∣∣c(a, x)∣∣= S|x|.
Moreover, we can ﬁx for every type σ a term Oσ in T ∗ of that type. One can then also deﬁne a projection function
σ ∗ → (0→ σ); we will write (x)i for the ith projection of x. It satisﬁes(〈〉σ )n =Oσ ,(
c(a, x)
)
0 = a,(
c(a, x)
)
Sn = (x)n.
In addition, we will have an operation which given x0, . . . , xn−1 of type σ builds an object x = 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉 of type σ ∗ for
which we have |x| = n and
(x)i = xi if i < |x|,
(x)i =Oσ otherwise.
We will also need a concatenation operation ∗σ ∗ : σ ∗ → (σ ∗ → σ ∗) deﬁned by
〈〉σ ∗σ ∗ y = y,
c(a, x) ∗σ ∗ y = c(a, x ∗ y).
This we can use to deﬁne an n-fold concatenation: If F : 0→ σ ∗ and n is of type 0, then we can set
(
F (0) ∗σ ∗ · · · ∗σ ∗ F (n − 1)
)=
{ 〈〉σ if n = 0,
(F (0) ∗σ ∗ · · · ∗σ ∗ F (n − 2)) ∗σ ∗ F (n − 1) if n > 0.
Note that F (0) ∗σ ∗ · · · ∗σ ∗ F (n− 1) = F (0) if n = 1.
Lemma 2.8.
1. E-HAω∗st  st(xσ ∗ ) → st(|x|),
2. E-HAω∗st  st(xσ ∗ ) → st((x)i),
3. E-HAω∗st  st(xσ0 )∧ · · · ∧ st(xσn ) → st(〈xσ0 , . . . , xσn 〉),
4. E-HAω∗st  st(xσ ∗ )∧ st(yσ ∗ ) → st(x ∗σ ∗ y),
5. E-HAω∗st  st(F 0→σ ∗ )∧ st(n0) → st(F (0) ∗ · · · ∗ F (n− 1)).
Proof. Follows from the T ∗st -axioms together with the fact that the list recursor L belongs to T ∗ . 
Notation 2.9.
1. Given x = xσ00 , . . . , xσm−1m−1 and i = i00, . . . , i0m−1 we will write |x| for |xσ00 |, . . . , |xσm−1m−1 | and (x)i for (xσ00 )i0 , . . . , (xσm−1m−1 )im−1 .
2. Given x = xσ00 , . . . , xσm−1m−1 and y = yσ00 , . . . , yσm−1m−1 , we will write 〈x〉 for 〈xσ00 〉, . . . , 〈xσm−1m−1 〉, and 〈x, y〉 for 〈x0, y0〉, . . . ,
〈xm−1, ym−1〉.
3. Given x = xσ ∗00 , . . . , x
σ ∗m−1
m−1 and y = y
σ ∗0
0 , . . . , y
σ ∗m−1
m−1 , we will write x ∗σ ∗ y for x0 ∗σ ∗0 y0, . . . , xm−1 ∗σ ∗m−1 ym−1.
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Most of the time, we will regard ﬁnite sequences as stand-ins for ﬁnite sets. In fact, we will need the notion of an
element and that of one sequence being contained in another, as given in the deﬁnitions below.
Deﬁnition 2.10. For sσ , tσ
∗
we write s ∈σ t and say that s is an element of t if
∃i < |t| (s =σ (t)i).
For sσ = sσ00 , . . . , sσn−1n−1 and tσ
∗ = tσ ∗00 , . . . , t
σ ∗n−1
n−1 we write s ∈σ t and say that s is an element of t if
n−1∧
k=0
sk ∈σk tk.
In case no confusion can arise, we will drop the subscript and write simply ∈ instead of ∈σ or ∈σ .
Lemma 2.11. E-HAω∗st  st(xσ ∗ )∧ y ∈σ x→ st(yσ ).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.8.2 and the extensionality of the st-predicate (ﬁrst part of the T ∗st -axiom). 
Deﬁnition 2.12. For sσ
∗
, tσ
∗
we write sσ t and say that s is contained in t if
∀xσ (x ∈ s → x ∈ t),
or, equivalently,
∀i < |s| ∃ j < |t| (s)i =σ (t) j.
For sσ
∗ = sσ ∗00 , . . . , s
σ ∗n−1
n−1 and tσ
∗ = tσ ∗00 , . . . , t
σ ∗n−1
n−1 we write sσ t and say that s is contained in t if
n−1∧
k=0
sk σk tk.
Lemma 2.13. E-HAω∗ proves thatσ determines a preorder on the set of objects of type σ ∗ . More precisely, for all xσ
∗
we have xσ x,
and for all xσ
∗
, yσ
∗
, zσ
∗
with xσ y and y σ z, we have xσ z.
Proof. Obvious. 
In relation to this ordering the notion of a property being upwards closed in a variable x will be of importance.
Deﬁnition 2.14. A property Φ(xσ
∗
) is called upwards closed in x if Φ(x) ∧ x  y → Φ(y) and downwards closed in x if
Φ(x)∧ y  x→ Φ(y).
2.5. Induction and extensionality for sequences
The aim of this subsection is to prove induction and extensionality principles for sequences. It all relies on the following
lemma:
Lemma 2.15.
1. E-HAω∗  ∀xσ ∗ (|x| = 0↔ x = 〈〉σ ).
2. E-HAω∗  ∀n0, xσ ∗ (|x| = Sn ↔ ∃a, yσ ∗ (x= c(a, y)∧ |y| = n)).
Proof. The right-to-left directions hold by deﬁnition of the length function | · |. So suppose we have an element x of type σ ∗ .
Then, by the sequence axiom SA, either x = 〈〉σ or there are aσ , yσ ∗ such that x = c(a, y). In the latter case, |x| = S|y| > 0,
so if |x| = 0, then x = 〈〉σ . But if |x| = Sn, then x = 〈〉σ and there are a, y with x = c(a, y) and |y| = n. 
Proposition 2.16. E-HAω∗ proves the induction schema for sequences:
ϕ
(〈〉σ )∧ ∀aσ , yσ ∗ (ϕ(y) → ϕ(c(a, y)))→ ∀xσ ∗ ϕ(x).
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∀n0 ∀xσ ∗ (|x| = n → ϕ(x))
by ordinary induction. 
One consequence is the following useful fact:
Lemma 2.17. E-HAω∗ proves that for any two elements xσ ∗ , yσ ∗ we have |x ∗ y| = |x| + |y| and
(x ∗ y)i = (x)i if i < |x|,
(x ∗ y)i = (y)i−|x| otherwise.
Therefore it also proves that xσ x ∗ y and y σ x ∗ y.
Proof. Easy argument using the recursive deﬁnitions of | · | and ∗ and the induction schema for sequences. 
Another consequence is the principle of extensionality for sequences. We will call two elements xσ
∗
, yσ
∗
extensionally
equal, and write x=e,σ ∗ y, if
|x| =0 |y| ∧ ∀i < |x|
(
(x)i =σ (y)i
)
.
Proposition 2.18. E-HAω∗ proves
∀xσ ∗ , yσ ∗ (x =e,σ ∗ y → x =σ ∗ y).
Proof. Proof by sequence induction on x.
If x=e y and x= 〈〉σ , then |y| = |x| = 0. So y = 〈〉σ .
If x =e y and x = c(a, x′), then |x| = Sn where n = |x′|. So also |y| = Sn and hence y = c(b, y′) for some bσ , y′σ ∗ with
|y′| = n. Since x =e y, we have a = b and x′ =e y′ . From the latter we get x′ = y′ by induction hypothesis, so x = c(a, x′) =
c(b, y′) = y. 
Corollary 2.19. E-HAω∗st proves
∀xσ ∗ st(|x|)∧ ∀i < |x| st((x)i)→ st(x).
Proof. Suppose xσ
∗
is a sequence of standard length and all components (x)i are standard. Then x′ := 〈x0, . . . , x|x|−1〉 is
also standard (by Lemma 2.8). But x =e,σ ∗ x′ , so x = x′ by extensionality for sequences and st(x) by extensionality of the
standardness predicate. 
Corollary 2.20. E-HAω∗st proves the external induction axiom for sequences:
Φ
(〈〉σ )∧ ∀staσ , yσ ∗ (Φ(y) → Φ(c(a, y)))→ ∀stxσ ∗ Φ(x).
Proof. Suppose Φ(〈〉σ ) and ∀staσ , yσ ∗ (Φ(y) → Φ(c(a, y))). The idea now is to prove
∀stn0 ∀stxσ ∗ (|x| = n → Φ(x))
by external induction IAst, using the previous corollary to argue that if x = c(a, y) and xσ ∗ is standard, then both a and y
are standard as well. 
2.6. Finite sequence application
The following operations will be crucial for what follows.
Deﬁnition 2.21 (Finite sequence application and abstraction). If s is of type (σ → τ ∗)∗ and t is of type σ , then
s[t] := (s)0(t) ∗ · · · ∗ (s)|s|−1(t) : τ ∗.
For every term s of type σ → τ ∗ we set
Λxσ . s(x) := 〈λxσ . s(x)〉 : (σ → τ ∗)∗.
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Λx . s(x)
)[t] =τ ∗ (λx . s(x))(t) =τ ∗ s(t).
We will often write s[t] and Λx . t; in handling these expressions, the same conventions as for ordinary application and
abstraction apply (see Section 2.1).
Note that the deﬁning equations for the sequence application and Λ-abstraction imply that ﬁnite sequence application
and ordinary application are (provably) interdeﬁnable, in the following sense: E-HAω∗ proves that for every s : (σ → τ ∗)∗
there is a t : σ → τ ∗ (viz., t = λx . s[x]) such that s[x] = t(x) for all x, as well as that for every t : σ → τ ∗ there is an s of
type (σ → τ ∗)∗ (viz., s = Λx . t(x)) such that s[x] = t(x) for all x.
In what follows we will need that one can deﬁne recursors Rρ for each tuple of types ρ∗ = ρ∗0 , . . . , ρ∗k , such that
Rρ(0, y, z) =ρ∗ y,
Rρ(n + 1, y, z) =ρ∗ z
[
n,Rρ(n, y, z)
]
(where yi is of type ρ∗i and zi is of type (0→ ρ∗0 → ·· · → ρ∗k → ρ∗i )∗). Indeed, by letting
Rρ := λn0, y, z . Rρ∗
(
n, y,
(
λsρ
∗
, t0 . z[t, s])),
where Rρ are constants for simultaneous primitive recursion as in [25], we get
Rρ(0, y, z) =ρ∗ Rρ∗
(
0, y,
(
λsρ
∗
, t0 . z[t, s]))=ρ∗ y
and
Rρ(n + 1, y, z) =ρ∗ Rρ∗
(
n + 1, y, (λsρ∗ , t0 . z[t, s]))
=ρ∗
(
λsρ
∗
, t0 . z[t, s])(Rρ∗(n, y, (λsρ∗ , t0 . z[t, s])),n)
=ρ∗ z
[
n, Rρ∗
(
n, y,
(
λsρ
∗
, t0 . z[t, s]))]
=ρ∗ z
[
n,Rρ(n, y, z)
]
.
Notice that when compared to the case of the ordinary primitive recursors Rρ we have switched the order of the arguments
of z. This is simply to make the realizer for the interpretation of the induction schema nicer.
With respect to the preorder  from Deﬁnition 2.12 the new application is monotone in the ﬁrst component, in the
following sense:
Lemma 2.22. E-HAω∗ proves:
1. If s(σ→τ ∗)∗  s˜(σ→τ ∗)∗ , then s[t] s˜[t], for all tσ .
2. If s s˜, then s[t] s˜[t] for all t of suitable types.
3. If s s˜, then s[t] s˜[t] for all t of suitable types.
Proof. We will only prove the ﬁrst point, as the other two are similar. Let i < |s[t]|, and consider (s[t])i . Since s[t] =τ ∗
(s)0(t) ∗ · · · ∗ (s)|s|−1(t) there is k < |s| and m < |(s)k(t)| such that(
s[t])i =τ ∗ ((s)k(t))m.
Since s s˜ there is j < |s˜| such that (s)k =σ→τ ∗ (s˜) j . Thus m < |(s˜) j(t)| and(
s[t])i =τ ∗ ((s˜) j(t))m,
and so since s˜[t] =τ ∗ (s˜)0(t) ∗ · · · ∗ (s˜)|s˜|−1(t) there is some n < |s˜[t]| such that(
s˜[t])n =τ ∗ ((s˜) j(t))m =τ ∗ (s[t])i . 
Lemma 2.23. E-HAω∗st proves
st(σ→τ ∗)∗(x)∧ stσ (y) → stτ ∗(x[y])
and
stσ→τ ∗(s) → st(σ→τ ∗)∗(Λxσ . s(x)).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.8. 
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Semantic approaches to nonstandard analysis exploit the existence of nonstandard models of the ﬁrst-order theory of
the natural numbers or the reals. In fact, one may use the compactness theorem for ﬁrst-order logic or the existence of
suitable nonprincipal ultraﬁlters to show that there are extensions of the natural numbers, the reals or any other ﬁrst-order
structure one might be interested in, that are elementary: that is, satisfy the same ﬁrst-order sentences, even when allowing
for parameters from the original structure. For the natural numbers, for instance, this means that there are structures ∗N
and embeddings i :N→ ∗N that satisfy
∗
N | ϕ(i(n0), . . . , i(nk)) ⇐⇒ N | ϕ(n0, . . . ,nk)
for all ﬁrst-order formulas ϕ(x0, . . . , xk) and natural numbers n0, . . . ,nk . Usually, one identiﬁes the elements in the image
of i with the natural numbers and calls these the standard natural numbers, while those that do not lie in the image of i
are the nonstandard natural numbers. Sometimes, one adds a new predicate st to the structure ∗N, which is true only of
the standard natural numbers. One can then use the elementarity of the embedding to show that ∗N is still a linear order
in which the nonstandard natural numbers must be inﬁnite (i.e., bigger than any standard natural number). The charm
and power of nonstandard proofs is that one can use these inﬁnite natural numbers to prove theorems in the nonstandard
structure ∗N, which must then be true in N as well, as the embedding i is elementary. The same applies to nonstandard
extensions ∗R of the reals, in which there are besides inﬁnite reals, also inﬁnitesimals (nonstandard reals having an absolute
value smaller than any positive standard real): these inﬁnitesimals can then be used to prove theorems in analysis in ∗R;
again, one can then go on to use the elementarity of the embedding to show that they must hold in R as well. The catch is
that only ﬁrst-order, internal statements can be lifted in this way: so using nonstandard models requires some understanding
about what can and what cannot be expressed in ﬁrst-order logic as well as some careful veriﬁcations as to whether
formulas are internal.
Besides creating an interesting world in which there are inﬁnite natural numbers and inﬁnitesimals, nonstandard analysis
also comes with some new proof principles, among which the following are the most important:
1. Overspill: if ϕ(x) is internal and holds for all standard x, then ϕ(x) also holds for some nonstandard x.
2. Underspill: if ϕ(x) is internal and holds for all nonstandard x, then ϕ(x) also holds for some standard x.
3. Transfer: an internal formula ϕ (possibly with standard parameters) holds in ∗N iff it holds in N.
Of course, transfer expresses the elementarity of the embedding. The other two principles are consequences of the fact
that it is impossible to deﬁne standardness in ∗N using an internal formula: for if one could, then ϕ(n) would hold in ∗N,
and hence in N, for every natural number n. This would imply that ∀x ϕ(x) holds in N and hence in ∗N as well; but that
contradicts the existence of nonstandard elements in ∗N.
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss these principles in more detail, for two related reasons. First of all, they
will provide us with three benchmarks with which we will be able to measure the success of the different interpretations.
Also, because they have some nontrivial consequences (especially in the intuitionistic context), discussing these will give us
some important clues as to how any interpretation of nonstandard analysis will have to look like.
Remark 3.1. Unless we state otherwise, the principles we will subsequently introduce in this paper may have additional
parameters besides those explicitly shown. Also recall that we follow Nelson’s convention in using small Greek letters to
denote internal formulas and capital Greek letters to denote formulas which can be external.
3.1. Overspill
When formalized in E-HAω∗st , overspill (in type 0) is the following statement:
OS0: ∀stx0 ϕ(x) → ∃x0
(¬st(x) ∧ ϕ(x)).
Proposition 3.2. (See [40].) In E-HAω∗st , the principle OS0 implies the existence of nonstandard natural numbers,
ENS0: ∃x0 ¬st(x),
as well as:
LLPOst0 : ∀stx0, y0
(
ϕ(x)∨ψ(y))→ ∀stx0 ϕ(x)∨ ∀st y0 ψ(y).
Proof. ENS0 follows trivially from OS0 by taking for ϕ(x) some trivially true formula (for instance, x = x).
If ∀stx0, y0 (ϕ(x)∨ψ(y)), then one can use external induction to prove
∀stn0 (∀m n ϕ(m)∨ ∀m n ψ(m)).
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we can prove that a nonstandard natural number must be bigger than any standard natural number. Hence ∀stx0 ϕ(x) ∨
∀st y0 ψ(y). 
Of course, overspill can be formulated for all types:
OS: ∀stxσ ϕ(x) → ∃xσ (¬st(x) ∧ ϕ(x)).
But, actually, the interpretations that we will discuss will not only verify this principle, but also a far-reaching generalization
of it, viz. a higher-type version of Nelson’s idealization principle [38]:
I: ∀stxσ ∗ ∃yτ ∀x′ ∈σ x ϕ
(
x′, y
)→ ∃yτ ∀stxσ ϕ(x, y).
Proposition 3.3. (See [40].) In E-HAω∗st , the idealization principle I implies overspill, as well as the statement that for every type σ
there is a nonstandard sequence containing all the standard elements of that type:
USEQ: ∃yσ ∗ ∀stxσ x ∈σ y.
Proof. OS for an internal formula ψ(y) follows from I by taking ϕ(x, y) :≡ y = x ∧ ψ(y), while USEQ follows by taking
ϕ(x, y) :≡ x ∈σ y. 
Proposition 3.4. In E-HAω∗st , the idealization principle I implies the existence of nonstandard elements of any type,
ENS: ∃xσ ¬st(x),
as well as LLPOst for any type:
LLPOst: ∀stxσ , yσ (ϕ(x)∨ψ(y))→ ∀stxσ ϕ(x)∨ ∀st yσ ψ(y).
Proof. The ﬁrst statement is obvious, so we concentrate on the second.
Suppose ∀stxσ , yσ (ϕ(x)∨ψ(y)). Then one easily proves by external sequence induction and by taking v := u that
∀stuσ ∗ ∃vσ ∗ ∀u′ ∈ u (u′ ∈ v ∧ (∀v ′ ∈ v ϕ(v ′)∨ ∀v ′ ∈ v ψ(v ′))).
By applying idealization to this statement we obtain
∃vσ ∗ ∀stuσ (u ∈ v ∧ (∀v ′ ∈ v ϕ(v ′)∨ ∀v ′ ∈ v ψ(v ′))),
from which LLPOst follows. 
Classically, idealization is equivalent to its dual, which we have dubbed the realization principle (intuitionistically, things
are not so clear):
R: ∀yτ ∃stxσ ϕ(x, y) → ∃stxσ ∗ ∀yτ ∃x′ ∈ x ϕ(x′, y).
As it turns out, both our interpretations will eliminate this principle as well. Actually, both interpretations for constructive
nonstandard analysis eliminate the stronger nonclassical realization principle:
NCR: ∀yτ ∃stxσ Φ(x, y) → ∃stxσ ∗ ∀yτ ∃x′ ∈ x Φ(x′, y),
where Φ(x, y) can be any formula. This is quite remarkable, as NCR is incompatible with classical logic (hence the name)
in that one can prove:
Proposition 3.5. In E-HAω∗st , the nonclassical realization principle NCR implies the undecidability of the standardness predicate:
¬∀xσ (st(x)∨ ¬st(x)).
Proof. Assume that standardness would be decidable. Then we would have
∀yσ ∃stxσ (st(y) → x = y).
Applying NCR to this statement yields
∃stxσ ∗ ∀yσ ∃x′ ∈ x (st(y) → x′ = y),
which is the statement that there are only ﬁnitely many standard elements of type σ . This is clearly absurd. 
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Underspill (in type 0) is the following statement:
US0: ∀x0
(¬st(x) → ϕ(x))→ ∃stx0 ϕ(x).
In a constructive context it has the following nontrivial consequence (compare [5]):
Proposition 3.6. In E-HAω∗st , the underspill principle US0 implies
MPst0 :
(∀stx0 (ϕ(x)∨ ¬ϕ(x))∧ ¬¬∃stx0 ϕ(x))→ ∃stx0 ϕ(x).
In particular, E-HAω∗st + US0  ¬¬st0(x) → st0(x).
Proof. We reason in E-HAω∗st + US0. Suppose ∀stx0 (ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)) and ¬¬∃stx0 ϕ(x).
Since the latter is intuitionistically equivalent to ¬∀stx0 ¬ϕ(x), this means that for every inﬁnite natural number ω, we
have ¬∀xω ¬ϕ(x). In other words, we have
∀ω0 (¬st(ω) → ¬∀xω ¬ϕ(x)).
So by US0 we have
∃st y ¬∀x y ¬ϕ(x),
which implies ∃stx ϕ(x) by decidability of ϕ(x) for standard values of x.
As a special case we have ¬¬st0(x) → st0(x), because st0(x) is equivalent to ∃st y0 (x =0 y) and equality of objects of
type 0 is decidable. 
Also underspill has a direct generalization to higher types:
US: ∀xσ (¬st(x) → ϕ(x))→ ∃stxσ ϕ(x).
A natural question is whether this implies a version of Markov’s principle for all types. Our suspicion is that this is not the
case, but we were unable to prove this.
3.3. Transfer
Following Nelson [38], the transfer principle is usually formulated as follows:
TP∀: ∀stt
(∀stx ϕ(x, t) → ∀x ϕ(x, t)).
(Here, for once, we do not allow parameters: so it is important that x and t include all free variables of the formula ϕ .) This
is classically, but not intuitionistically, equivalent to the following:
TP∃: ∀stt
(∃x ϕ(x, t) → ∃stx ϕ(x, t)),
where, once again, we do not allow parameters.
It turns out that interpreting transfer is very diﬃcult, especially in a constructive context (in fact, Avigad and Helzner
have devoted an entire paper [5] to this issue). There are, at least, the following three problems:
1. Transfer principles together with overspill imply instances of the law of excluded middle, as was ﬁrst shown by Moerdijk
and Palmgren in [37]. In our setting we have:
Proposition 3.7.
(a) In E-HAω∗st , the combination of ENS0 and TP∀ implies the law of excluded middle for all internal arithmetical formulas.
(b) In E-HAω∗st , the combination of USEQ and TP∀ implies the law of excluded middle for all internal formulas.
Proof. Ad (a): assume ENS0 and TP∀ . We show that every internal arithmetic formula ϕ is decidable by induction on
the number of internal quantiﬁers in ϕ . Atomic internal arithmetical formulas are decidable anyway, so the base case is
easy.
If ϕ(x0, t) is an internal formula which is decidable and arithmetical (and with all free variables shown), then one can
use internal induction to show
∀y0 (∃x y ¬ϕ(x, t)∨ ∀x y ϕ(x, t)).
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∃xω ¬ϕ(x, t) and in particular ∃x ¬ϕ(x, t) or we have ∀xω ϕ(x, t) and in particular ∀stx ϕ(x, t). So
∀stt (∃x ¬ϕ(x, t)∨ ∀stx ϕ(x, t)).
Applying TP∀ once we get
∀stt (∃x ¬ϕ(x, t)∨ ∀x ϕ(x, t))
and applying it another time we get
∀t (∃x ¬ϕ(x, t)∨ ∀x ϕ(x, t)).
This completes the induction step.
In (b) we argue similarly. First, we use the extensionality principles for functions and sequences to eliminate all equality
predicates at higher types in favor of equalities at type 0. This makes all internal atomic formulas decidable. Since
decidable formulas are closed under all propositional connectives, this leaves the case of the quantiﬁers. So suppose
ϕ(xσ , t) is an internal formula which is decidable and let u be a sequence containing all standard elements of type σ
(using USEQ). Then we have
∃u′ ∈ u ¬ϕ(u′, t)∨ ∀u′ ∈ u ϕ(u′, t).
In the former case it holds that ∃xσ ¬ϕ(x, t) and in the latter that ∀stxσ ϕ(x, t). And from here the argument proceeds
as before. 
2. As Avigad and Helzner observe in [5], also the combination of transfer principles with underspill results in a system
which is no longer conservative over Heyting arithmetic. More precisely, adding US0 and TP∀ , or US0 and TP∃ , to
E-HAω∗st results in a system which is no longer conservative over Heyting arithmetic HA. The reason is that there are
quantiﬁer-free formulas A(x) such that
HA ¬¬∃x A(x) → ∃x A(x).
Since one can prove a version of Markov’s principle in E-HAω∗st + US0, adding either TP∀ or TP∃ to it would result in a
nonconservative extension of HA (and hence of E-HAω∗). We refer to [5] for more details.
3. The last point applies to functional interpretations only. As is well known, in the context of functional interpretations
the axiom of extensionality always presents a serious problem and when developing a functional interpretation of
nonstandard arithmetic, the situation is no different. Now, E-HAω∗st includes an internal axiom of extensionality (as it is
part of E-HAω∗), but for the functional interpretation that we will introduce in Section 5 that will be harmless. What
will be very problematic for us, however, is the following version of the axiom of extensionality: if for two elements
f , g of type σ1 → (σ2 → ·· · → 0), we deﬁne
f =st g :≡ ∀stxσ11 , xσ22 , . . . ( f x=0 gx),
then extensionality formulated as
∀st f ∀stx, y (x =st y → f x=st f y)
will have no witness deﬁnable in ZFC. But that means that also TP∀ can have no witness deﬁnable in ZFC: for in the
presence of TP∀ both versions of extensionality are equivalent.
One way out of this quandary, which is strongly suggested by the last point and is the route taken in most sources
(beginning with [36]), is to have transfer not as a principle, but as a rule. As we will see, this turns out to be feasible. In
fact, we will have two transfer rules (which are not equivalent, not even classically):
∀stx ϕ(x)
∀x ϕ(x) TR∀
∃x ϕ(x)
∃stx ϕ(x) TR∃.
(This time round there are no special requirements on the parameters of ϕ .)
Remark 3.8. In this section we have also explored several connections between nonstandard principles. More principles will
be introduced below and we will prove one more implication (see Proposition 5.11). We have not tried to determine the
precise relationships between these principles – in particular, we do not know precisely which principles follow and do not
follow over E-HAω∗st from combinations of other principles. In fact, we believe that mapping these connections would be an
interesting research project.
4. Herbrand realizability
In this section we will introduce a new realizability interpretation, which will allow us to prove our ﬁrst consistency and
conservation results in the context of E-HAω∗st . Our treatment here will be entirely proof-theoretic; for a semantic approach
towards Herbrand realizability, see [6].
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The interpretation works by associating to every formula Φ(x) a formula Ψ (t, x), also denoted by t hrΦ(x), where t is a
tuple of new variables all of which are of sequence type, determined solely by the logical form of Φ(x). The soundness proof
will then involve showing that for every formula Φ(x) of E-HAω∗st with E-HAω∗st  Φ(x) there is an appropriate tuple t of
terms from T ∗ such that E-HAω∗st  t hrΦ(x).
The idea of the interpretation is that we interpret internal quantiﬁers uniformly and that we do not attempt to give
them any computational content. In a sense, the only predicate to which we will assign any computational content is the
standardness predicate st: to realize stσ (x), however, it suﬃces to provide a nonempty ﬁnite list of terms of type σ , one of
which will have to be equal to x. Therefore to realize a statement of the form ∃stxσ Φ(x) one only needs to provide a ﬁnite
list 〈y0, . . . , yn〉 and to make sure that Φ(yi) is realized for some i  n (which is like giving a Herbrand disjunction; hence
the name “Herbrand realizability”).
The precise deﬁnition is as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Herbrand realizability for E-HAω∗st ).
[] hrϕ :≡ ϕ for an internal atomic formula ϕ,
s hr st(x) :≡ x ∈ s,
s, t hr(Φ ∨Ψ ) :≡ s hrΦ ∨ t hrΨ,
s, t hr(Φ ∧Ψ ) :≡ s hrΦ ∧ t hrΨ,
s hr(Φ → Ψ ) :≡ ∀stt (t hrΦ → s[t]hrΨ ),
s hr∃x Φ(x) :≡ ∃x (s hrΦ(x)),
s hr∀x Φ(x) :≡ ∀x (s hrΦ(x)),
s, t hr∃stx Φ(x) :≡ ∃s′ ∈ s (t hrΦ(s′)),
s hr∀stx Φ(x) :≡ ∀stx (s[x]hrΦ(x)).
Before we show the soundness of the interpretation, we ﬁrst prove some easy lemmas:
Deﬁnition 4.2 (The ∃st-free formulas). We call a formula (in the language of E-HAω∗st ) ∃st-free, if it is built up from internal
atomic formulas (including ⊥) using the connectives ∧, ∨, → and the quantiﬁers ∃x, ∀x and ∀stx. Alternatively, one could
say that these are the formulas in which st and ∃st do not occur. We denote such formulas by Φst .
Lemma 4.3 (Interpretation of ∃st-free formulas). All the interpretations t hrΦ(x) of formulas Φ(x) of E-HAω∗st are ∃st-free. In addition,
every ∃st-free formula is interpreted by itself. Hence the interpretation is idempotent.
The following lemma will be crucial for what follows:
Lemma 4.4 (Realizers are provably upwards closed). The formula t hrΦ(x) is provably upwards closed in t, that is
E-HAω∗st  s hrΦ ∧ s t → t hrΦ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of Φ , using the monotonicity of the new application in the ﬁrst component in the
clauses for → and ∀st. 
Theorem 4.5 (Soundness of Herbrand realizability). Let Φ be an arbitrary formula of E-HAω∗st and st be an arbitrary set of ∃st-free
sentences. Whenever
E-HAω∗st +st  Φ(x),
then one can extract from the formal proof closed terms t in T ∗ , such that
E-HAω∗st +st  t hrΦ(x).
Proof. As for the logical axioms and rules, the differences with the usual soundness proof of modiﬁed realizability for
E-HAω (as in [48] or Theorem 5.8 in [25]) are
(a) that we require the realizing terms to be closed,
(b) that we have a nonconstructive interpretation of disjunction, and
(c) that we interpret the quantiﬁers in a uniform fashion.
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1. The contraction axiom A ∨ A → A is realized by Λx, y . x ∗ y, using that the collection of realizers is provably upwards
closed.
2. The weakening axiom A → A ∨ B is realized by Λx . x,O.
3. The permutation axiom A ∨ B → B ∨ A is realized by Λx, y . y, x.
4. The axioms of ∀-elimination ∀x Φ(x) → Φ(t) and ∃-introduction Φ(t) → ∃x Φ(x) are realized by the identity tuple
Λx . x.
5. The expansion rule A→BA∨C→A∨C : if t hr A → B , then Λx, y . t[x], y is a Herbrand realizer of A ∨ C → A ∨ C .
6. The ∀-introduction rule Φ→Ψ (x)
Φ→∀x Ψ (x) is interpreted, because s hr(Φ → Ψ (x)) implies s hr(Φ → ∀x Ψ (x)): for if t hrΦ and
st(t), then s[t]hrΨ (x) and therefore s[t]hr∀x Ψ (x).
7. The ∃-introduction rule Φ(x)→Ψ∃x Φ(x)→Ψ is interpreted, because s hr(Φ(x) → Ψ ) implies s hr(∃x Φ(x) → Ψ ): for if t hr∃x Φ(x)
and st(t), then there is an x such that t hrΦ(x), from which it follows that s[t]hrΨ .
The sentences from st and the axioms of E-HAω∗ , including SA and the deﬁning axioms for equality, successor, combi-
nators and recursion, are ∃st-free and therefore realized by themselves. Therefore it remains to show the soundness of the
following axioms:
1. The external quantiﬁer axioms EQ: both directions in ∃stx Φ(x) ↔ ∃x (st(x) ∧ Φ(x)) are interpreted by the identity. In
∀stx Φ(x) ↔ ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)) the right-to-left direction is realized by Λs, x . s[〈x〉], while the left-to-right direction is
realized by Λs, x . s[x0] ∗ · · · ∗ s[x|x|−1].
2. The axiom schemes T ∗st : the principle st(x) ∧ x = y → st(y) is realized by the identity, while st(t) is realized by 〈t〉. In
addition, st( f )∧ st(x) → st( f x) is realized by Λ f , x . 〈 f i(x j)〉i<| f |, j<|x| .
3. The induction schema IAst: suppose s hrΦ(0) and t hr∀stn (Φ(n) → Φ(n+ 1)), with st(s) and st(t). Then E-HAω∗st proves
by external induction that for standard natural numbers n, the term R(n, s, t) is standard and R(n, s, t)hrΦ(n). There-
fore Λx, y,n .R(n, x, y)hr IAst. 
4.2. The characteristic principles of Herbrand realizability
In this section we will prove that HAC (the herbrandized axiom of choice), HIPst (the herbrandized independence of
premise principle for ∃st-free formulas) and NCR axiomatize Herbrand realizability:
1. HAC:
∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y) → ∃stF ∀stx ∃y ∈ F (x) Φ(x, y),
where Φ(x, y) can be any formula. If Φ(x, y) is upwards closed in y, then this is equivalent to
∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y) → ∃stF ∀stx Φ(x, F (x)).
2. HIPst :(
Φ → ∃st y Ψ (y))→ ∃st y (Φ → ∃y′ ∈ y Ψ (y′)),
where Φ has to be an ∃st-free formula and Ψ (y) can be any formula. If Ψ (y) is upwards closed in y, then this is
equivalent to(
Φ → ∃st y Ψ (y))→ ∃st y (Φ → Ψ (y)).
3. NCR:
∀x ∃st y Φ(x, y) → ∃st y ∀x ∃y′ ∈ y Φ(x, y′),
where Φ(x, y) can be any formula. If Φ(x, y) is upwards closed in y, then this is equivalent to
∀x ∃st y Φ(x, y) → ∃st y ∀x Φ(x, y).
Theorem 4.6 (Characterization theorem for Herbrand realizability).
1. For any instance Φ of HAC, HIPst or NCR, there are closed terms t in T ∗ such that
E-HAω∗st  t hrΦ.
2. For any formula Φ of E-HAω∗st , we have
E-HAω∗st + HAC + HIPst + NCR  Φ ↔ ∃stx (xhrΦ).
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t[x]hrΦ(x, s′). Hence 〈λx . s[x]〉, t hr∃stF ∀stx ∃y ∈ F (x) Φ(x, y). So HAC is realized by Λx, y . 〈λz . x[z]〉, y.
Soundness of HIPst : Suppose Φ is ∃st-free, r = s, t and r hrΦ → ∃st y Φ(y). This means that if Φ would hold, then there
would be an s′ ∈ s such that t hrΨ (s′). Hence 〈s〉, t hr∃st y (Φ → ∃y′ ∈ y Ψ (y′)). So HIPst is realized by Λx, y . 〈x〉, y.
In a similar manner one checks that also NCR is realized by Λx, y . 〈x〉, y. This completes the proof of item 1.
Item 2 one proves by induction on the logical structure of Φ . We discuss implication as an illustrative case, as it is by far
the hardest, and leave the other cases to the reader. We reason in E-HAω∗st + HAC + HIPst + NCR. By induction hypothesis,
we have that Φ ↔ ∃stt (t hrΦ) and Ψ ↔ ∃sts (s hrΨ ) and therefore
Φ → Ψ
is equivalent to
∃stt (t hrΦ) → ∃sts (s hrΨ ),
which in turn is equivalent to
∀stt (t hrΦ → ∃sts (s hrΨ )).
Because t hrΦ is ∃st-free and s hrΨ is upwards closed in s, we can use HIPst to rewrite this as:
∀stt ∃sts (t hrΦ → s hrΨ ).
As t hrΦ → s hrΨ is upwards closed in s and ﬁnite sequence application and ordinary application are interdeﬁnable, we can
use HAC to see that this is equivalent to
∃sts ∀stt (t hrΦ → s[t]hrΨ ),
which is precisely the meaning of ∃sts (s hr(Φ → Ψ )). 
Theorem 4.7 (Main theorem on program extraction by hr). Let ∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y) be a sentence of E-HAω∗st and st be an arbitrary
set ∃st-free sentences. Then the following rule holds
E-HAω∗st + HAC + HIPst + NCR +st  ∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y)
⇒ E-HAω∗st + HAC + HIPst + NCR +st  ∀stx ∃y ∈ t(x) Φ(x, y),
where t is a closed term from T ∗ which is extracted from the original proof using Herbrand realizability.
In the particular case where both Φ(x, y) and st are internal, the conclusion yields
E-HAω∗ +st  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) Φ(x, y).
If we assume that the sentences from st are not just internal, but also true (in the set-theoretic model), the conclusion implies that
∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) Φ(x, y) must be true as well.
Proof. If
E-HAω∗st + HAC + HIPst + NCR +st  ∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y),
then the soundness proof yields terms r, s such that
E-HAω∗st +st  r, s hr∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y).
Since r, s hr∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y) is by deﬁnition ∀stx ∃y ∈ r[x] (s hrΦ(x, y)), the ﬁrst statement follows by taking t = λx . r[x].
If both Φ(x, y) and st are internal, then s is empty and we get
E-HAω∗st +st  ∀stx ∃y ∈ t(x) Φ(x, y).
By internalizing the statement, we obtain
E-HAω∗ +st  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) Φ(x, y).
Since all the axioms of E-HAω∗ are true, this implies that ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) Φ(x, y) will be true, whenever st is. 
4.3. Discussion
The main virtue of Herbrand realizability may be that it points one’s attention to principles like HAC and NCR and
that it gives one a simple proof of their consistency. However, as a method for eliminating nonstandard principles from
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nonclassical principle NCR), but overspill, the idealization principle I and the transfer rules are ∃st-free and therefore simply
passed to the verifying system. Even worse, the underspill principle US0 does not have a computable Herbrand realizer:
Proposition 4.8. MPst0 and US0 do not have computable Herbrand realizers.
Proof. It is well known that there can be no computable function witnessing the modiﬁed realizability interpretation of
Markov’s principle, because its existence would imply the decidability of the halting problem. A similar argument shows
that MPst0 does not have a computable Herbrand realizer: Kleene’s T -predicate T (e, x,n) is primitive recursive and hence
E-HAω∗st  ∀ste, x,n
(
T (e, x,n) ∨ ¬T (e, x,n)).
So if MPst0 would have a computable realizer, then so would
∀ste (¬¬∃stn T (e, e,n) → ∃stn T (e, e,n)).
But if t would be such a realizer, we could decide the halting problem by checking T (e, e,n) for all n ∈ t[e].
Since US0 implies MPst0 (see Proposition 3.6), it follows that US0 does not have a computable realizer either. 
In the next section, we will show that these problems can be overcome by moving from realizability to, more compli-
cated, functional interpretations.
5. A functional interpretation for E-HAω∗st
In this section we will introduce and study a functional interpretation for E-HAω∗st .
5.1. The interpretation
The basic idea of the Dst-interpretation (the nonstandard Dialectica interpretation) is to associate to every formula Φ(a)
a new formula Φ(a)Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst(x, y,a) such that
1. all variables in x are of sequence type and
2. ϕDst(x, y,a) is upwards closed in x.
We will interpret the standardness predicate stσ similarly to the case for Herbrand realizability: For a realizer for the
interpretation of stσ (x) we will require a standard ﬁnite list 〈y0, . . . , yn〉 of candidates, one of which must be equal to x.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (The Dst-interpretation for E-HAω∗st ). We associate to every formula Φ(a) in the language of E-HAω∗st (with free
variables among a) a formula Φ(a)Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst (x, y,a) in the same language (with the same free variables) by:
(i) ϕ(a)Dst :≡ ϕDst(a) :≡ ϕ(a) for internal atomic formulas ϕ(a),
(ii) stσ (uσ )Dst :≡ ∃stxσ ∗ u ∈σ x.
Let Φ(a)Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst(x, y,a) and Ψ (b)Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψDst(u, v,b). Then
(iii) (Φ(a)∧Ψ (b))Dst :≡ ∃stx,u ∀st y, v (ϕDst (x, y,a)∧ψDst(u, v,b)),
(iv) (Φ(a)∨Ψ (b))Dst :≡ ∃stx,u ∀st y, v (ϕDst (x, y,a)∨ψDst(u, v,b)),
(v) (Φ(a) → Ψ (b))Dst :≡ ∃stU , Y ∀stx, v (∀y ∈ Y [x, v] ϕDst(x, y,a) → ψDst(U [x], v,b)).
Let Φ(z,a)Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst(x, y, z,a), with the free variable z not occurring among the a. Then
(vi) (∀z Φ(z,a))Dst :≡ ∃stx ∀st y ∀z ϕDst(x, y, z,a),
(vii) (∃z Φ(z,a))Dst :≡ ∃stx ∀st y ∃z ∀y′ ∈ y ϕDst(x, y′, z,a),
(viii) (∀stz Φ(z,a))Dst :≡ ∃stX ∀stz, y ϕDst(X[z], y, z,a),
(ix) (∃stz Φ(z,a))Dst :≡ ∃stx, z ∀st y ∃z′ ∈ z ∀y′ ∈ y ϕDst(x, y′, z′,a).
Deﬁnition 5.2. We say that a formula Φ is a ∀st-formula if Φ ≡ ∀stx ϕ(x), with ϕ(x) internal.
Lemma 5.3. Let Φ be a ∀st-formula. Then ΦDst ≡ Φ .
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Notice that because of the clause for ∃stz the interpretation is not idempotent. Similarly to what is the case for Herbrand
realizability it will be crucial that realizers are upwards closed:
Lemma 5.4. Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-HAω∗st with interpretation ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst (x, y,a). Then the formula
ϕDst(x, y,a) is provably upwards closed in x, i.e.,
E-HAω∗  ϕDst(x, y,a)∧ x x′ → ϕDst
(
x′, y,a
)
.
Proof. By induction on the structure of Φ(a), using Lemma 2.22 in the clauses for → and ∀st. 
The Dst-interpretation will allow us to interpret the nonclassical realization principle NCR, and also both I and HAC. Ad-
ditionally we will be able to interpret a herbrandized independence of premise principle for formulas of the form ∀stx ϕ(x),
and also a herbrandized form of a generalized Markov’s principle:
1. HIP∀st :(∀stx ϕ(x) → ∃st y Ψ (y))→ ∃st y (∀stx ϕ(x) → ∃y′ ∈ y Ψ (y′)),
where Ψ (y) is a formula in the language of E-HAω∗st and ϕ(x) is an internal formula. If Ψ (y) is upwards closed in y,
then this is equivalent to(∀stx ϕ(x) → ∃st y Ψ (y))→ ∃st y (∀stx ϕ(x) → Ψ (y)).
2. HGMPst:(∀stx ϕ(x) → ψ)→ ∃stx (∀x′ ∈ x ϕ(x′)→ ψ),
where ϕ(x) and ψ are internal formulas in the language of E-HAω∗st . If ϕ(x) is downwards closed in x, then this is
equivalent to(∀stx ϕ(x) → ψ)→ ∃stx (ϕ(x) → ψ).
The latter gives us a form of Markov’s principle by taking ψ ≡ 0 =0 1 and ϕ(x) ≡ ¬ϕ0(x) (with ϕ0(x) internal and
quantiﬁer-free), whence the name.
Theorem 5.5 (Soundness of the Dst-interpretation). Let Φ(a) be a formula of E-HAω∗st and let int be a set of internal sentences. If
E-HAω∗st + I + NCR + HAC + HGMPst + HIP∀st +int  Φ(a)
and Φ(a)Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst(x, y,a), then from the proof we can extract closed terms t in T ∗ such that
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀y ϕDst(t, y,a).
Proof. As in the proof of the soundness of the Dialectica interpretation we proceed by induction on the length of the
derivation.
1. We will ﬁrst consider the logical axioms and rules:
(a) A → A ∧ A:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) we have
(A → A ∧ A)Dst ≡ ∃stX ′, X ′′, Y ∀stx, y′, y′′(∀z ∈ Y [x, y′, y′′] ϕ(x, z,a) → ϕ(X ′[x], y′,a)∧ ϕ(X ′′[x], y′′,a)),
and we can take
X ′ := Λx . x,
X ′′ := Λx . x,
Y := Λx, y′, y′′ . 〈y′, y′′〉.
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With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) we have
(A ∨ A → A)Dst ≡ ∃stX ′′, Y , Y ′ ∀stx, x′, y′′((∀z ∈ Y [x, x′, y′′] ϕ(x, z,a)∨ ∀z′ ∈ Y ′[x, x′, y′′] ϕ(x′, z′,a))→ ϕ(X ′′[x, x′], y′′,a)),
and we can take
X ′′ := Λx, x′ . x ∗ x′,
Y := Λx, y, y′′ . 〈y′′〉,
Y ′ := Λx, y, y′′ . 〈y′′〉.
(c) A → A ∨ B:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) and BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b) we have
(A → A ∨ B)Dst ≡ ∃stX ′,U , Y ∀stx, y′, v(∀z ∈ Y [x, y′, v] ϕ(x, z,a) → ϕ(X ′[x], y′,a)∨ψ(U [x], v,b)),
and we can take
X ′ := Λx . x,
Y := Λx, y′, v . 〈y′〉,
U := Λx .O.
(d) A ∧ B → A:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) and BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b) we have
(A ∧ B → A)Dst ≡ ∃stX ′, Y , V ∀stx,u, y′(∀z ∈ Y [x,u, y′] ∀t ∈ V [x,u, y′] (ϕ(x, z,a)∧ψ(u, t,b))→ ϕ(X ′[x,u], y′,a)),
and we can take
X ′ := Λx,u . x,
Y := Λx,u, y′ . 〈y′〉,
V := Λx,u, y′ .O.
(e) A ∨ B → B ∨ A:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) and BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b) we have
(A ∨ B → B ∨ A)Dst ≡ ∃stU ′, X ′, Y , V ∀stx,u, v ′, y′(∀z ∈ Y [x,u, v ′, y′] ∀t ∈ V [x,u, v ′, y′] (ϕ(x, z,a)∨ψ(u, t,b))→ (ψ(U ′[x,u], v ′,b)∨ ϕ(X ′[x,u], y′,a))),
and we can take
U ′ := Λx,u . u,
X ′ := Λx,u . x,
Y := Λx,u, v ′, y′ . 〈y′〉,
V := Λx,u, v ′, y′ . 〈v ′〉.
(f) A ∧ B → B ∧ A:
We can take the same terms as for A ∨ B → B ∨ A, since ∨ and ∧ are handled in the same way by the interpreta-
tion.
(g) ⊥ → A:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) we have
(⊥ → A)Dst ≡ ∃stX ∀st y (⊥ → ϕ(X, y,a)),
and we can take X :=O.
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With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z,a) we have
(∀z A → A[t/z])Dst ≡ ∃stX ′, Y ∀stx, y′(∀w ∈ Y [x, y′] ∀z ϕ(x,w, z,a) → ϕ(X ′[x], y′, t,a)),
and we can take
X ′ := Λx . x,
Y := Λx, y′ . 〈y′〉.
(i) A[t/z] → ∃zA:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z,a) we have
(
A[t/z] → ∃zA)Dst ≡ ∃stX ′, Y ∀stx, y′(∀w ∈ Y [x, y′] ϕ(x,w, t,a) → ∃z ∀w ∈ y′ ϕ(X ′[x],w, z,a)),
and we can take
X ′ := Λx . x,
Y := Λx, y′ . y′.
(j) The modus ponens rule:
We assume that we have terms t1 and T 2, T 3 realizing the interpretations of respectively A and A → B ,
and we wish to obtain terms T 4 realizing the interpretation of B . So with ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a) and
BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b) we have
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀y ϕ(t1, y,a)
and
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, v
(∀z ∈ T 3[x, v] ϕ(x, z,a) → ψ(T 2[x], v,b)).
With T 4 := T 2[t1] we get
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀v ψ(T 4, v,b),
as desired.
(k) The syllogism rule:
We assume that we have terms T 1, T 2 and T 3, T 4 realizing the interpretations of respectively A → B and B → C ,
and we wish to obtain terms T 5, T 6 realizing the interpretation of A → C . So with ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a),
BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b), and CDst ≡ ∃stw ∀stz χ(w, z, c) we have
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, v
(∀i ∈ T 2[x, v] ϕ(x, i,a) → ψ(T 1[x], v,b)) (1)
and
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀u, z
(∀ j ∈ T 4[u, z] ψ(u, j,b) → χ(T 3[u], z, c)), (2)
and we wish to obtain T 5, T 6 such that
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, z
(∀k ∈ T 6[x, z] ϕ(x,k,a) → χ(T 5[x], z, c)).
To do this we let T 5 := Λx . T 3[T 1[x]], T 7 := Λx, z . T 4[T 1[x], z] and apply (2) with u = T 1[x], such that
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, z
(∀ j ∈ T 7[x, z] ψ(T 1[x], j,b)→ χ(T 5[x], z, c)).
As a special case of (1) we get
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, z ∀ j ∈ T 7[x, z](∀i ∈ T 2[x, j] ϕ(x, i,a) → ψ(T 1[x], j,b)),
and thus
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, z(∀ j ∈ T 7[x, z] ∀i ∈ T 2[x, j] ϕ(x, i,a) → χ(T 5[x], z, c)).
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T 6[x, z] =σ T 2
[
x, T 7[x, z]0
] ∗σ · · · ∗σ T 2[x, T 7[x, z]|T 7[x,z]|−1],
where the concatenation is to include T 2[x, T 7[x, z] j] for each j < |T 7[x, z]|, which one can easily do using terms
from T ∗ .
(l) The importation and exportation rules:
With ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a), BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b), and CDst ≡ ∃stw ∀stz χ(w, z, c) we get
(A ∧ B → C)Dst ≡ ∃stW , Y , V ∀stx,u, z(∀i ∈ Y [x,u, z] ∀ j ∈ V [x,u, z] (ϕ(x, i,a)∧ψ(u, j,b))→ χ(W [x,u], z, c))
and
(
A → (B → C))Dst ≡ ∃stW , Y , V ∀stx,u, z(∀i ∈ Y [x,u, z] ϕ(x, i,a) → (∀ j ∈ V [x,u, z] ψ(u, j,b) → χ(W [x,u], z, c))),
so that the same terms realize the interpretations of A ∧ B → C and A → (B → C).
(m) The expansion rule:
We assume that we have terms T 1, T 2 realizing the interpretation of A → B , and we wish to obtain terms T 3, T 4,
T 5, T 6 realizing the interpretation of C ∨ A → C ∨ B . So with ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,a), BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b),
and CDst ≡ ∃stw ∀stz χ(w, z, c) we have
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, v
(∀i ∈ T 2[x, v] ϕ(x, i,a) → ψ(T 1[x], v,b)),
and we want T 3, T 4, T 5, T 6 such that
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀w, x, z′, v(∀ j ∈ T 5[w, x, z′, v] ∀i ∈ T 6[w, x, z′, v] (χ(w, j, c)∨ ϕ(x, i,a))
→ χ(T 3[w, x], z′, c)∨ψ(T 4[w, x], v,b)).
Thus we can take
T 3 := Λw, x . w,
T 4 := Λw, x . T 1[x],
T 5 := Λw, x, z′, v .
〈
z′
〉
,
T 6 := Λw, x, z′, v . T 2[x, v].
(n) The quantiﬁer rules:
i. We assume that we have terms T 1, T 2 realizing the interpretation of B → A, and we want terms T 3, T 4
realizing the interpretation of B → ∀z A, where z is not among the free variables of B . Thus with ADst ≡
∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z,a) and BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b) we have
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀u, y
(∀i ∈ T 2[u, y] ψ(u, i,b) → ϕ(T 1[u], y, z,a)),
and we want
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀u, y
(∀i ∈ T 4[u, y] ψ(u, i,b) → ∀z ϕ(T 3[u], y, z,a)).
Hence we may take T 3 := T 1 and T 4 := T 2.
ii. We have terms T 1, T 2 realizing the interpretation of A → B , and we want terms T 3, T 4 realizing the interpre-
tation of ∃z A → B , where z is not among the free variables of B . Thus with ADst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z,a) and
BDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v,b) we have
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, v
(∀i ∈ T 2[x, v] ϕ(x, i, z,a) → ψ(T 1[x], v,b)),
and we want
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x, v
(∀k ∈ T 4[x, v] ∃z ∀i ∈ k ϕ(x, i, z,a) → ψ(T 3[x], v,b)).
So we can take T 3 := T 1 and T 4 := Λx, v . 〈T 2[x, v]〉.
2. The nonlogical axioms of E-HAω∗: These axioms are all internal, and so their Dst-interpretations are all realized by the
empty tuple of terms.
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(a) ∀stx Φ(x) ↔ ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)):
We treat ﬁrst ∀stx Φ(x) → ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)). With ΦDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ϕ(u, v, x,a) we get(∀stx Φ(x))Dst ≡ ∃stU ∀stx, v ϕ(U [x], v, x,a)
and (∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)))Dst ≡ ∃stU ′ ∀stz, v ′ ∀x (x ∈ z → ϕ(U ′[z], v ′, x,a)),
and thus (∀stx Φ(x) → ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)))Dst is
∃stU˜ ′, X, V ∀stU , z, v ′(∀i ∈ X[U , z, v ′] ∀ j ∈ V [U , z, v ′] ϕ(U [i], j, i,a)→ ∀x (x ∈ z → ϕ(U˜ ′[U , z], v ′, x,a))).
Let now
X := ΛU , z, v ′ . z,
V := ΛU , z, v ′ . 〈v ′〉,
U˜ ′ := ΛU , z . U [z0] ∗ · · · ∗ U [z|z|−1]
(with
U [z0] ∗ · · · ∗ U [z|z|−1] := U0[z0] ∗ · · · ∗ U0[z|z|−1], . . . ,Un−1[z0] ∗ · · · ∗ Un[z|z|−1]
for U = U0, . . . ,Un−1).
Next we treat ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)) → ∀stx Φ(x). Similarly to the case above we get that (∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)) →
∀stx Φ(x))Dst is
∃stU˜ , Z , V ′ ∀stU ′, x, v(∀k ∈ Z[U ′, x, v] ∀ j ∈ V ′[U ′, x, v] ∀x′ ∈ k ϕ(U ′[k], j, x′,a)→ ϕ(U˜[U ′, x], v, x,a)).
Hence we can take
Z := ΛU ′, x, v . 〈〈x〉〉,
V ′ := ΛU ′, x, v . 〈v〉,
U˜ := ΛU ′, x . U ′[〈x〉].
(b) ∃stx Φ(x) ↔ ∃x (st(x)∧Φ(x)):
First we treat ∃stx Φ(x) → ∃x (st(x)∧Φ(x)). With ΦDst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ϕ(u, v, x,a) we get(∃stx Φ(x))Dst ≡ ∃stu, x ∀stv ∃i ∈ x ∀ j ∈ v ϕ(u, j, i,a)
and (∃x (st(x) ∧Φ(x)))Dst ≡ ∃stz,u′ ∀stv ′ ∃x′ ∀ j ∈ v ′ (x′ ∈ z ∧ ϕ(u′, j, x′,a)),
and thus (∃stx Φ(x) → ∃x (st(x)∧Φ(x)))Dst is
∃st Z ,U ′, V ∀stu, x, v ′(∀l ∈ V [u, x, v ′] ∃k ∈ x ∀n ∈ l ϕ(u,n,k,a) → ∃x′ ∀ j ∈ v ′ (x′ ∈ Z [u, x] ∧ ϕ(U ′[u, x], j, x′,a))).
Thus we can take
Z := Λu, x . x,
U ′ := Λu, x . u,
V := Λu, x, v ′ . 〈v ′〉.
Finally we consider ∃x (st(x) ∧ Φ(x)) → ∃stx Φ(x). Similarly to the case above we get that (∃x (st(x) ∧ Φ(x)) →
∃stx Φ(x))Dst is
∃stU , X, V ′ ∀stz,u′, v(∀l ∈ V ′[z,u′, v] ∃x′ ∀ j ∈ l (x′ ∈ z ∧ ϕ(u′, j, x′,a))→ ∃k ∈ X[z,u′] ∀n ∈ v ϕ(U[z,u′],n,k,a)).
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X := Λz,u′ . z,
U := Λz,u′ . u′,
V ′ := Λz,u′, v . 〈v〉.
4. The schemata T ∗st :
(a) st(x)∧ x= y → st(y): We have that (st(x) ∧ x = y → st(y))Dst is
∃stV ∀stu (x ∈ u ∧ x = y → y ∈ V [u]),
and so we can take V := Λu . u.
(b) st(t) for closed terms t in T ∗: Since
(
st(t)
)Dst ≡ ∃stx t ∈ x,
we can take x := 〈t〉.
(c) st( f σ→τ )∧ st(xσ ) → st( f (x)): We have that (st( f )∧ st(x) → st( f (x)))Dst is
∃stW ∀stu, v ( f ∈ u ∧ x ∈ v → f (x) ∈ W [u, v]),
hence it is enough to construct a closed term W such that
W [u, v] =τ ∗
〈
ui(v j): i < |u|, j < |v|
〉
,
and this we can do easily using closed terms from T ∗ .
5. The external induction axiom IAst: We will consider the equivalent external induction rule
IRst: Φ(0), ∀
stn0 (Φ(n) → Φ(n + 1))
∀stn0 Φ(n) ,
from which one can derive IAst by taking
Φ
(
m0
) :≡ Ψ (0)∧ ∀stn0 (Ψ (n) → Ψ (n + 1))→ Ψ (m).
We assume that we have terms T 1 and T 2, T 3 realizing the interpretations of Φ(0) and ∀stn0 (Φ(n) → Φ(n + 1)), and
we wish to obtain terms T 4 realizing the interpretation of ∀stn0 Φ(n). So with (Φ(n))Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y,n,a) we
have
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀y ϕ(T 1, y,0,a)
and
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀n0, x, y′(∀i ∈ T 3[n, x, y′] ϕ(x, i,n,a) → ϕ(T 2[n, x], y′,n + 1,a)),
and we want
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀n0, y ϕ
(
T 4[n], y,n,a
)
. (3)
By taking T 4 := Λn0 .R(n, T 1, T 4) we get
E-HAω∗ +int  T 4[0] =ρ T 1,
E-HAω∗ +int  T 4[n + 1] =ρ T 2
[
n, T 4[n]
]
,
which suﬃces to establish (3).
6. The principles I, NCR, HAC, HIP∀st , and HGMPst:
(a) I: The Dst-interpretations of the premise and the conclusion of any instance of I are identical, and it is easy to show
that Λx . 〈x〉 realizes the interpretation of the whole implication, provably in E-HAω∗ .
(b) NCR: Suppose (Φ(x, y))Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ϕ(u, v, x, y). Then
(∀x ∃st y Φ(x, y))Dst ≡ ∃stu, y ∀stv ∀x ∃i ∈ y ∀ j ∈ v ϕ(u, j, x, i)
and
(∃st y ∀x ∃k ∈ y Φ(x,k))Dst ≡ ∃stu, y ∀stv ∃m ∈ y ∀n ∈ v ∀x ∃k ∈m ∀l ∈ n ϕ(u, l, x,k),
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∃stU , Y , V ∀stu, y, v(∀i ∈ V [u, y, v] ∀x ∃ j ∈ y ∀k ∈ i ϕ(u,k, x, j) → ∃m ∈ Y [u, y] ∀n ∈ v ∀x˜ ∃k˜ ∈m ∀l ∈ n ϕ(U [u, y], l, x˜, k˜)).
Thus we can take
U := Λu, y . u,
Y := Λu, y . 〈y〉,
V := Λu, y, v . v.
(c) HAC: Let (Φ(x, y))Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ϕ(u, v, x, y). Then (∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y))Dst is
∃stU , Y ∀stx, v ∃i ∈ Y [x] ∀ j ∈ v ϕ(U [x], j, x, i)
and (∃stF ∀stx ∃i ∈ F (x) Φ(x, i))Dst is
∃stU˜ , F ∀stx˜, v˜ ∃k ∈ F ∀l ∈ x˜ ∀m ∈ v˜ ∃i′ ∈ k(l) ∀ j′ ∈m ϕ(U˜ [l], j′, l, i′),
so (∀stx ∃st y Φ(x, y) → ∃stF ∀stx ∃i ∈ F (x) Φ(x, i))Dst is
∃stU˜ , F , X, V ∀stU , Y , x˜, v˜(∀n ∈ X[U , Y , x˜, v˜] ∀n′ ∈ V [U , Y , x˜, v˜] ∃i ∈ Y [n] ∀ j ∈ n′ ϕ(U [n], j,n, i)
→ ∃k ∈ F [U , Y ] ∀l ∈ x˜ ∀m ∈ v˜ ∃i′ ∈ k(l) ∀ j′ ∈m ϕ(U˜ [U , Y ][l], j′, l, i′)).
Hence we can take
U˜ := ΛU , Y . U ,
F := ΛU , Y . 〈λx . Y [x]〉,
X := ΛU , Y , x˜, v˜ . x˜,
V := ΛU , Y , x˜, v˜ . v˜.
(d) HIP∀st : Let (Ψ (y))Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v, y). Then (∀stx ϕ(x) → ∃st y Ψ (y))Dst is
∃stU , Y , X ∀stv (∀k ∈ X[v] ϕ(k) → ∃i ∈ Y ∀ j ∈ v ψ(U , j, i))
and (∃st y (∀stx ϕ(x) → ∃i ∈ y Ψ (i)))Dst is
∃stU , X, y ∀stv ∃n ∈ y ∀m ∈ v (∀k ∈ X[m] ϕ(k) → ∃i ∈ n ∀ j ∈m ψ(U , j, i)),
so the Dst-interpretation of HIP∀st is
∃stU˜ , X˜, Y˜ , V ∀stU , Y , X, v˜(∀l ∈ V [U , Y , X, v˜] (∀k ∈ X[l] ϕ(k) → ∃i ∈ Y ∀ j ∈ l ψ(U , j, i))
→ ∃n˜ ∈ Y˜ [U , Y , X] ∀m˜ ∈ v˜ (∀k˜ ∈ X˜[U , Y , X][m˜] ϕ(k˜) → ∃i˜ ∈ n˜ ∀ j˜ ∈ m˜ ψ(U˜ [U , Y , X], j˜, i˜))).
Hence we can take
U˜ := ΛU , Y , X . U ,
X˜ := ΛU , Y , X . X,
Y˜ := ΛU , Y , X . 〈Y 〉,
V := ΛU , Y , X, v˜ . v˜.
(e) HGMPst: The Dst-interpretation of HGMPst is
∃stX ∀stx ((∀x′ ∈ x ϕ(x′)→ ψ)→ ∃ j ∈ X[x] (∀k ∈ j ϕ(k) → ψ)),
and we can take X := Λx . 〈x〉. 
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Helzner [5].
Corollary 5.6. The system
E-HAω∗st + I + NCR + HAC + HGMPst + HIP∀st
is a conservative extension of E-HAω∗ and hence of E-HAω .
Proof. By Theorem 5.5 and Lemma 5.3. 
Remark 5.7. We could deﬁne a system E-HAω∗nst by adding primitive predicates nstσ (“nonstandard”) to E-HAω∗st for each
ﬁnite type σ , along with axioms
∀xσ (nst(x) ↔ ¬st(x)).
If we then extend the Dst-interpretation by(
nstσ
(
xσ
))Dst :≡ ∀st yσ y =σ x,
we get an analogue of Theorem 5.5, since (nst(x) → ¬st(x))Dst is provably equivalent to
∃stY ∀stz (∀y ∈ Y [z] (y = x) → x /∈ z)
and (¬st(x) → nst(x))Dst to
∃st Z ∀st y (∀z′ ∈ Z [y] x /∈ z′ → y = x),
so that we can take Y [z] := z and Z [y] := 〈〈y〉〉 respectively.
5.2. The characteristic principles of the nonstandard functional interpretation
In this section we will prove that the characteristic principles of the nonstandard functional interpretation are I, NCR,
HAC, HIP∀st , and HGMPst. For notational simplicity we will let
H := E-HAω∗st + I + NCR + HAC + HIP∀st + HGMPst.
Theorem 5.8 (Characterization theorem for the nonstandard functional interpretation).
1. For any formula Φ in the language of E-HAω∗st we have
H  Φ ↔ ΦDst .
2. For any formula Ψ in the language of E-HAω∗st we have: If for all Φ in L(E-HAω∗st ) (with ΦDst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ϕDst(x, y)) the implica-
tion
H +Ψ  Φ ⇒ there are closed terms t ∈ T ∗ s.t. E-HAω∗  ∀y ϕDst(t, y) (4)
holds, then H  Ψ .
Proof. 1. We will prove item 1 by induction on the logical structure of Φ .
(a) As induction start we note that for internal atomic ϕ we obviously have H  ϕ ↔ ϕDst , that
H  st(uσ )→ ∃stxσ ∗ u ∈ x
follows by taking x := 〈u〉, and that
H  ∃stxσ ∗ u ∈ x → st(uσ )
is Lemma 2.11.
(b) For the induction step involving Φ , Ψ we will use that (see 1.6.17 in [48]) via appropriate embeddings of tuples of
types in a suitable common higher type and tuple coding of functionals with inverses (all given by terms in T ∗) there
are ϕ(x, y), ψ(u, v) such that
E-HAω∗st  ΦDst ↔ ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y)
and
E-HAω∗st  Ψ Dst ↔ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v),
and such that ϕ(x, y) and ψ(u, v) are provably upwards closed in x and u respectively.
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∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v) ↔ ∃stx,u ∀st y, v (ϕ(x, y) ∧ψ(u, v)),
which follows by intuitionistic logic. (We can assume that u, v do not appear in ϕ , and that x, y do not appear
in ψ .)
ii. For ∨ we note that
∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y) ∨ ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v) ↔ ∃stx,u ∀st y, v (ϕ(x, y) ∨ψ(u, v))
follows from LLPOst, which by Proposition 3.4 follows from I.
iii. For implication we use that ψ(u, v) is upwards closed in u to conclude
∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y) → ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v)
↔ ∀stx (∀st y ϕ(x, y) → ∃stu ∀stv ψ(u, v))
HIP∀st↔ ∀stx ∃stu (∀st y ϕ(x, y) → ∀stv ψ(u, v))
↔ ∀stx ∃stu ∀stv (∀st y ϕ(x, y) → ψ(u, v))
HGMPst↔ ∀stx ∃stu ∀stv ∃st y (∀i ∈ y ϕ(x, i) → ψ(u, v))
HAC↔ ∃stU ∀stx ∀stv ∃st y (∀i ∈ y ϕ(x, i) → ψ(U (x), v))
HAC+coding x,v into one↔ ∃stU , Y ∀stx, v (∀i ∈ Y (x, v) ϕ(x, i) → ψ(U (x), v))
↔ ∃stU , Y ∀stx, v (∀i ∈ Y [x, v] ϕ(x, i) → ψ(U [x], v)).
iv. For ∀ we use NCR and that ϕ(x, y, z) is upwards closed in x to get
∀z ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z) NCR↔ ∃stx ∀z ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z) ↔ ∃stx ∀st y ∀z ϕ(x, y, z).
v. For ∃ we use I:
∃z ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z)
↔ ∃stx ∃z ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z)
I↔ ∃stx ∀st y ∃z ∀y′ ∈ y ϕ(x, y′, z).
vi. For ∀st we use HAC and that ϕ(x, y, z) is upwards closed in x:
∀stz ∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z) HAC↔ ∃stX ∀stz, y ϕ(X(z), y, z) ↔ ∃stX ∀stz, y ϕ(X[z], y, z).
vii. For ∃st we will again use I:
∃stz (∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z))
↔ ∃stz ∃z′ ∈ z (∃stx ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z′))
↔ ∃stz ∃stx ∃z′ ∈ z ∀st y ϕ(x, y, z′)
I↔ ∃stz ∃stx ∀st y ∃z′ ∈ z ∀y′ ∈ y ϕ(x, y′, z′).
2. Assume that Ψ is a formula of L(E-HAω∗st ) such that implication (4) holds, and let Ψ Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y ψDst(x, y). Then
because of item 1 we have
H +Ψ  Ψ
⇒ ∃t ∈ T ∗ s.t. E-HAω∗  ∀y ψDst(t, y)
⇒ ∃t ∈ T ∗ s.t. E-HAω∗st  ∀y ψDst(t, y)
⇒ ∃t ∈ T ∗ s.t. E-HAω∗st  ∀st y ψDst(t, y)
⇒ E-HAω∗st  ∃stx ∀st y ψDst(x, y)
⇒ H  ∃stx ∀st y ψDst(x, y)
⇒ H  Ψ. 
Theorem 5.5 allows us to extract a ﬁnite sequence of candidates for the existential quantiﬁer in formulas of the form
∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y), in the following sense:
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ϕ(x, y) an internal formula, and let int be a set of internal sentences. If
E-HAω∗st + I + NCR + HAC + HGMPst + HIP∀st +int  ∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y),
then from the proof we can extract a closed term t in T ∗ such that
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y).
Proof. Since(∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y))Dst ≡ ∃stY ∀stx ∃y ∈ Y [x] ϕ(x, y)
it follows from the soundness theorem of the Dst-interpretation that there is a closed term s such that
E-HAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ∈ s[x] ϕ(x, y),
and so we can let t := λx . s[x]. 
Remark 5.10. Probably it is clear by now that our functional interpretation has some striking similarities with the bounded
functional interpretation due to Ferreira and Oliva [12]. Also there the authors work with two types of quantiﬁers, get an
interpretation whose matrix is upwards closed in the ﬁrst component (albeit with respect to a different ordering), interpret
implications à la Diller–Nahm and have some similar looking characteristic principles, like a monotone axiom of choice.
But, still, the precise relationship is not entirely clear to us, because we are now comparing the external quantiﬁers with
the unbounded quantiﬁers in the bounded functional interpretation, which is not very natural. These issues deserve to be
further investigated.
5.3. Discussion
It follows from the soundness of the Dst-interpretation (Theorem 5.5) that it can be used to eliminate nonstandard
principles, like overspill, realization and idealization, from proofs. It also allows one to eliminate underspill, since we have
the following result (recall that R is the realization principle from Section 4.1):
Proposition 5.11.We have
E-HAω∗st + R + HGMPst  US,
and therefore the underspill principle US is eliminated by the Dst-interpretation.
Proof. We reason in E-HAω∗st + R + HGMPst. Assume ∀xσ (¬st(x) → ϕ(x)). Our aim is to ﬁnd a standard x such that ϕ(x)
holds.
∀xσ (¬st(x) → ϕ(x)) is equivalent to ∀xσ (∀st yσ (y = x) → ϕ(x)), which, using HGMPst, we can rewrite as
∀xσ ∃st yσ ∗ (∀y′ ∈ y (y′ = x)→ ϕ(x)).
It now follows from R that there is a standard y of type σ ∗ such that
∀xσ (∀y′ ∈ y (y′ = x)→ ϕ(x)).
So if we choose x to be a standard element of type σ different from all y′ ∈ y, then ϕ(x) will hold. 
We also have:
Proposition 5.12. The system H :≡ E-HAω∗st + I + NCR + HAC + HGMPst + HIP∀st is closed under both transfer rules, TR∀ and TR∃ .
Proof. If H  ∀stx ϕ(x), then E-HAω∗  ∀x ϕ(x) by soundness of the Dst-interpretation. Since E-HAω∗ is a subsystem of H, it
follows that H  ∀x ϕ(x). This shows that H is closed under TR∀ .
If H  ∃x ϕ(x), then E-HAω∗  ∃x ϕ(x) by conservativity of H over E-HAω∗ . Since E-HAω∗ has the existence property
(the usual argument for the existence property of E-HAω , as in [25, Corollary 5.24], for instance, carries over to E-HAω∗), it
follows that there is a term t in T ∗ such that E-HAω∗  ϕ(t). Again, because E-HAω∗ is a subsystem of H, we have H  ϕ(t)
as well, and since all terms from T ∗ are provably standard in H, we have H  ∃stx ϕ(x). This shows that H is closed under
TR∃ as well. 
Therefore our functional interpretation Dst meets all the benchmarks that we discussed in Section 4.
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By combining the functional interpretation from the previous section with negative translation we can obtain con-
servation and term extraction results for classical systems as well. We will work out the details in this and the next
section.
First, we need to set up a suitable classical system E-PAω∗st . It will be an extension of E-PAω∗ , which is E-HAω∗ with
the law of excluded middle added for all formulas. When working with classical systems, we will often take the logical
connectives ¬, ∨, ∀ as primitive and regard the others as deﬁned. In a similar spirit, the language of E-PAω∗st will be that
of E-PAω∗ extended just with unary predicates stσ for every type σ ∈ T ∗; the external quantiﬁers ∀st, ∃st are regarded as
abbreviations:
∀stx Φ(x) :≡ ∀x (st(x) → Φ(x)),
∃stx Φ(x) :≡ ∃x (st(x) ∧Φ(x)).
Deﬁnition 6.1 (E-PAω∗st ). The system E-PAω∗st is
E-PAω∗st := E-PAω∗ + T ∗st + IAst
where:
• T ∗st consists of:
1. the schema st(x)∧ x = y → st(y),
2. a schema providing for each closed term t in T ∗ the axiom st(t),
3. the schema st( f )∧ st(x) → st( f x).
• IAst is the external induction axiom:
IAst: (Φ(0)∧ ∀stn0 (Φ(n) → Φ(n + 1)))→ ∀stn0 Φ(n).
Again we warn the reader that the induction axiom from E-PAω∗(
ϕ(0)∧ ∀n0 (ϕ(n) → ϕ(n+ 1)))→ ∀n0 ϕ(n)
is supposed to apply to internal formulas ϕ only.
As for E-HAω∗st , we have:
Proposition 6.2. If a formula Φ is provable in E-PAω∗st , then its internalization Φ int is provable in E-PAω∗ . Hence E-PAω∗st is a conser-
vative extension of E-PAω∗ and E-PAω .
We will now show how negative translation provides an interpretation of E-PAω∗st in E-HAω∗st . Various negative transla-
tions exist, with the one due to Gödel and Gentzen being the most well known. Here, we work with two variants, the ﬁrst
of which is due to Kuroda [33].
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Kuroda’s negative translation for E-PAω∗st ). For an arbitrary formula Φ in the language of E-PAωst , we deﬁne its
Kuroda negative translation in E-HAω∗st as
ΦKu :≡ ¬¬ΦKu,
where ΦKu is deﬁned inductively on the structure of Φ as follows:
ΦKu :≡ Φ for atomic formulas Φ,
(¬Φ)Ku :≡ ¬ΦKu,
(Φ ∨Ψ )Ku :≡ ΦKu ∨ΨKu,(∀x Φ(x))Ku :≡ ∀x ¬¬ΦKu(x).
Theorem 6.4. E-PAω∗st  Φ ↔ ΦKu and if E-PAω∗st +  Φ then E-HAω∗st +Ku  ΦKu .
Proof. It is clear that, classically, Φ , ΦKu and ΦKu are all equivalent. The second statement is proved by induction on
the proof of E-PAω∗st +   Φ . For the cases of the axioms and rules of classical logic and E-PAω∗ , see, for instance, [25,
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instance of T ∗st or IAst, the statement is proved. 
It will turn out to be convenient to introduce a second negative translation, extracted from the work of Krivine by
Streicher and Reus (see [32,47,46]). This translation will interpret E-PAω∗st into E-HAω∗nst (see Remark 5.7).
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Krivine’s negative translation for E-PAω∗st ). For an arbitrary formula Φ in the language of E-PAω∗st , we deﬁne its
Krivine negative translation in E-HAω∗nst as
ΦKr :≡ ¬ΦKr,
where ΦKr is deﬁned inductively on the structure of Φ as follows
ϕKr :≡ ¬ϕ for an internal atomic formula ϕ,
st(x)Kr :≡ nst(x),
(¬Φ)Kr :≡ ¬ΦKr,
(Φ ∨Ψ )Kr :≡ ΦKr ∧ΨKr,(∀x Φ(x))Kr :≡ ∃x ΦKr(x).
Theorem 6.6. For every formula Φ in the language of E-PAω∗st , we have:
1. E-HAω∗nst  ΦKr ↔ ΦKu .
2. If E-PAω∗st +  Φ , then E-HAω∗nst +Kr  ΦKr .
Proof. Item 1 is easily proved by induction on the structure of Φ . Item 2 follows from item 1 and Theorem 6.4. 
7. A functional interpretation for E-PAω∗st
We will now combine negative translation and our functional interpretation Dst to obtain a functional interpretation of
the classical system E-PAω∗st .
7.1. The interpretation
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Sst-interpretation for E-PAω∗st ). To each formula Φ(a) with free variables a in the language of E-PAω∗st we
associate its Sst-interpretation
Φ Sst(a) :≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕS(x, y,a),
where ϕS is an internal formula. Moreover, x and y are tuples of variables whose length and types depend only on the
logical structure of Φ . The interpretation of the formula is deﬁned inductively on its structure. If
Φ Sst(a) :≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕS(x, y,a) and Ψ Sst(b) :≡ ∀stu ∃stv ψS(u, v,b),
then
(i) ϕ Sst :≡ ϕ for atomic internal ϕ(a),
(ii) (st(z))Sst :≡ ∃stx (z = x),
(iii) (¬Φ)Sst :≡ ∀stY ∃stx ∀y ∈ Y [x] ¬ϕS(x, y,a),
(iv) (Φ ∨Ψ )Sst :≡ ∀stx,u ∃st y, v (ϕS (x, y,a)∨ψS (u, v,b)),
(v) (∀z ϕ)Sst :≡ ∀stx ∃st y ∀z ∃y′ ∈ y ϕS(x, y′, z).
Theorem 7.2 (Soundness of the Sst-interpretation). Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and suppose Φ(a)Sst ≡∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y,a). If int is a collection of internal formulas and
E-PAω∗st +int  Φ(a),
then one can extract from the formal proof a sequence of closed terms t in T ∗ such that
E-PAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y,a).
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Lemma 7.3. Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and assume
Φ Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y,a) and
(ΦKr)
Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv θ(u, v,a).
Then the tuples x and u have the same length and the variables they contain have the same types. The same applies to y and v. In
addition, we have
E-PAω∗  ϕ(x, y,a) ↔ ¬θ(x, y,a).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of Φ .
(i) If Φ ≡ ψ , an internal and atomic formula, then ϕ ≡ ψ and θ ≡ ¬ψ , so E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ .
(ii) If Φ ≡ st(z), then ϕ ≡ y = z and θ ≡ y = z, so E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ .
(iii) If Φ ≡ ¬Φ ′ with (Φ ′)Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ′(x, y,a) and (Φ ′Kr)Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv θ ′(u, v,a), then ϕ ≡ ∀y′ ∈ Y [x] ¬ϕ′(x, y′) and
θ ≡ ¬∀i ∈ Y [x] θ ′(x, i). Since E-PAω∗  ϕ′ ↔ ¬θ ′ by induction hypothesis, also E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ .
(iv) If Φ ≡ Φ0 ∨Φ1 with
Φ
Sst
i ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕi(x, y,a)
and (
(Φi)Kr
)Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv θi(u, v,a),
then ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 and θ ≡ θ0 ∧ θ1. Since E-PAω∗  ϕi ↔ ¬θi by induction hypothesis, also E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ .
(v) If Φ ≡ ∀z Φ ′ with(
Φ ′
)Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ′(x, y, z,a)
and (
Φ ′Kr
)Dst ≡ ∃stu ∀stv θ ′(u, v, z,a),
then ϕ ≡ ∀z ∃y′ ∈ y ϕ′(x, y′, z,a) and θ ≡ ∃z ∀y′ ∈ y θ ′(x, y′, z,a). Since E-PAω∗  ϕ′ ↔ ¬θ ′ by induction hypothesis,
also E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ . 
Remark 7.4. This lemma is the reason why we introduced the system E-HAω∗nst in Remark 5.7: it would fail if we would let
the Krivine negative translation land directly in E-HAω∗st with st(z)Kr = ¬st(z). As it is, this lemma yields a quick proof of
the soundness of the Sst-interpretation.
Proof of the soundness of the Sst-interpretation, Theorem 7.2. Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and let ϕ
and θ be such that
Φ Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y,a),
(ΦKr)
Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y θ(x, y,a)
and E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ , as in Lemma 7.3.
Now, suppose that int is a set of internal formulas and Φ(a) is a formula provable in E-PAω∗st from int . We ﬁrst apply
soundness of the Krivine negative translation (Theorem 6.6) to see that
E-HAω∗nst +Krint  ΦKr,
where ΦKr ≡ ¬ΦKr . So if (ΦKr)Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y θ(x, y,a), then
(
ΦKr
)Dst ≡ ∃stY ∀stx ∃y ∈ Y [x] ¬θ(x, y,a).
It follows from the soundness theorem for Dst (Theorem 5.5) and Remark 5.7 that there is a sequence of closed terms s
from T ∗ such that
E-HAω∗ +Krint  ∀x ∃y ∈ s[x] ¬θ(x, y,a).
Since E-PAω∗  Krint ↔ int and E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ we have
E-PAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y,a),
with t ≡ λx . s[x]. 
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The characteristic principles of our functional interpretation for classical arithmetic are idealization I (or, equivalently, R:
see Section 4.1) and HACint
∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y) → ∃stF ∀stx ∃y ∈ F (x) ϕ(x, y),
which is the choice scheme HAC restricted to internal formulas. To see this, note ﬁrst of all that we have:
Proposition 7.5. For any formula Φ in the language of E-PAω∗st one has
E-PAω∗st + I + HACint  Φ ↔ Φ Sst .
Proof. An easy proof by induction on the structure of Φ , using HACint for the case of negation and I (or rather R) in the
case of internal universal quantiﬁcation. 
For the purpose of showing that I and HACint are interpreted, it will be convenient to consider the “hybrid” system
E-HAω∗nst + LEMint , where LEMint is the law of excluded middle for internal formulas. For this hybrid system we have the
following easy lemma, whose proof we omit:
Lemma 7.6.We have:
1. E-HAω∗nst + LEMint  ϕKu ↔ ϕ , if ϕ is an internal formula in the language of E-PAω∗st .
2. E-HAω∗nst + LEMint + I  IKu .
3. E-HAω∗nst + LEMint + HACint + HGMPst  HACKuint .
This means we can strengthen Theorem 7.2 to:
Theorem 7.7 (Soundness of the Sst-interpretation, full version). Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and suppose
Φ(a)Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y,a). If int is a collection of internal formulas and
E-PAω∗st + I + HACint +int  Φ(a),
then one can extract from the formal proof a sequence of closed terms t in T ∗ such that
E-PAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y,a).
Proof. The argument is a slight extension of the proof of Theorem 7.2. So, once again, let Φ(a) be a formula in the language
of E-PAω∗st and ϕ and θ be such that
Φ Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y,a),
(ΦKr)
Dst ≡ ∃stx ∀st y θ(x, y,a)
and E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ , as in Lemma 7.3.
This time we suppose int is a set of internal formulas and Φ(a) is a formula provable in E-PAω∗st from I + HACint +int .
We ﬁrst apply soundness of the Kuroda negative translation (Theorem 6.4), which yields
E-HAω∗nst + IKu + HACKuint +Kuint  ΦKu.
Then the previous lemma implies that:
E-HAω∗nst + LEMint + I + HACint + HGMPst +Kuint  ΦKu.
Note that E-HAω∗nst  ΦKu ↔ ΦKr , ΦKr ≡ ¬ΦKr and(
ΦKr
)Dst ≡ ∃stY ∀stx ∃y ∈ Y [x] ¬θ(x, y,a).
Therefore the soundness theorem for Dst (Theorem 5.5), in combination with Remark 5.7 and the fact that the axiom
scheme LEMint is internal, implies that there is a sequence of closed terms s from T ∗ such that
E-HAω∗ + LEM +Kuint  ∀x ∃y ∈ s[x] ¬θ(x, y,a).
Since E-PAω∗  LEM, E-PAω∗  Kuint ↔ int and E-PAω∗  ϕ ↔ ¬θ , we have
E-PAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ∈ t(x) ϕ(x, y,a)
with t ≡ λx . s[x]. 
Fig. 1 depicts the relation between the various interpretations we have established.
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(·)Ku
(·)Sst E-HAω∗nst + LEMint + I + NCR + HAC + HGMPst + HIP∀st
(·)Dst
E-PAω∗
Fig. 1. The Shoenﬁeld and negative Dialectica interpretations.
7.3. Conservation results and the transfer principle
Theorem 7.7 immediately gives us the following conservation result:
Corollary 7.8. E-PAω∗st + I + HACint is a conservative extension of E-PAω∗ and hence of E-PAω .
We conjecture that this result is not the best possible and that E-PAω∗st + I + HACint + TP∀ is also conservative over
E-PAω∗ . This would follow from:
Conjecture 7.9. Let Φ(a) be a formula in the language of E-PAω∗st and suppose Φ(a)Sst ≡ ∀stx ∃st y ϕ(x, y,a). If int is a collection of
internal formulas and
E-PAω∗st + I + HACint + TP∀ +int  Φ(a),
then
E-PAω∗ +int  ∀x ∃y ϕ(x, y,a).
Unfortunately, one cannot prove this by showing that one can strengthen the hypothesis of Theorem 7.7 from E-PAω∗st +
I + HACint +int  Φ(a) to E-PAω∗st + I + HACint + TP∀ +int  Φ(a), for this strengthened version fails. To see why, note that
the Sst-interpretation of TP∀
∀stt (∀stx ϕ(x, t) → ∀x ϕ(x, t))
is provably equivalent to
∀stt ∃st y (ϕ(y, t) → ∀x ϕ(x, t)).
Therefore such a strengthened version of Theorem 7.7 would imply that for any formula in the language of E-PAω∗ without
parameters ϕ(x) there are terms t1, . . . , tn such that
E-PAω∗ 
∧
i
ϕ(ti) → ∀x ϕ(x).
To refute this general statement, it suﬃces to consider a quantiﬁer-free formula ϕ(x) such that ∀x ϕ(x) is true, but not
provable in E-PAω (such as “x is not the Gödel number of a proof in E-PAω of ⊥”). This last argument does not refute the
conjecture, for the statement
∀t ∃y (ϕ(y, t) → ∀x ϕ(x, t))
is a tautology and hence provable in E-PAω∗ .
Still, we expect that adding TP∀ to E-PAω∗st + I + HACint does not destroy conservativity over E-PAω∗ , because transfer is
part of many similar nonstandard systems that have been shown to be conservative over classical base theories (see [41]
and [39]). One natural way to attack this problem would be to try to prove Conjecture 7.9 along the lines of [39]. We plan
to take up these issues in future work.
8. Conclusion and plans for future work
We hope this paper lays the groundwork for future uses of functional interpretations to analyse nonstandard arguments
and systems. There are many directions, both theoretical and applied, in which one could further develop this research
topic. We conclude this paper by mentioning a few possibilities which we would like to take up in future research.
First of all, we would like to see if the interpretations that we have developed in this paper could be used to “unwind”
or “proof-mine” nonstandard arguments. Nonstandard arguments have been used in areas where proof-mining techniques
have also been successful, such as metric ﬁxed point theory (for methods of nonstandard analysis applied to metric ﬁxed
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theory (for a nonstandard proof of an ergodic theorem, see [20]; for applications of proof-mining to ergodic theory, see [3,
4,15,16,26,28,44]), therefore this looks quite promising. For the former type of applications to work in full generality, one
would have to extend our functional interpretation to include types for abstract metric spaces, as in [17,24].
But there are also a number of theoretical questions which still need to be answered. Several have been mentioned al-
ready: for example, mapping the precise relationships between the nonstandard principles that we have introduced. Another
question was whether E-PAω∗st + I + HACint + TP∀ is conservative over E-PAω∗ . Another question is whether our methods al-
low one to prove conservativity results over WE-HAω and WE-PAω as well: this will be important if one wishes to combine
the results presented here with the proof-mining techniques from [25].
In addition, we would also like to understand the use of saturation principles in nonstandard arguments. These are of
particular interest for two reasons: ﬁrst, they are used in the construction of Loeb measures, which belong to one of the
most successful nonstandard techniques. Secondly, for certain systems it has turned out that extending them with saturation
principles has resulted in an increase in proof-theoretic strength (see [18,21]).
The general saturation principle is
SAT: ∀stxσ ∃yτ Φ(x, y) → ∃ f σ→τ ∀stxσ Φ(x, f (x)).
Whether this principle has a Dst-interpretation within Gödel’s T ∗ , we do not know; but
CSAT: ∀stn0 ∃yτ Φ(n, y) → ∃ f 0→τ ∀stn0 Φ(n, f (n))
has and that seems to be suﬃcient for the construction of Loeb measures. Interpreting CSAT and SAT in the classical context
using the Sst-interpretation is probably quite diﬃcult and it is possible that they require some form of bar recursion. We
hope to be able to clarify this in future work.
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